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My Family Belongs to Me:
A Child’s Constitutional Right to
Family Integrity
Shanta Trivedi1
Every day in the United States, the government separates children from
their parents based on their parents’ immigration status, incarceration, or in-
volvement in the child welfare system—and the children have no say in the mat-
ter. The majority of these families are racial minorities and economically
underprivileged.
Under current law, children’s ability to assert a constitutional right to keep
their families free from government intrusion is not always apparent. This is in
part because a single piece of Supreme Court dicta has muddied an otherwise
clear family integrity doctrine, and many federal circuits are silent on the issue.
Further, many children’s advocates fail to assert this argument in court, or chil-
dren appear without advocates at all. Accordingly, the law remains stagnant.
Under Fourteenth Amendment due process jurisprudence, parents have a
well-established fundamental liberty interest in their relationship with their chil-
dren. Parents can therefore forcefully assert a constitutional violation when the
state seeks to infringe on their familial relationship through the child welfare,
criminal, and/or immigration systems. A child’s assertion of the same right, how-
ever, has not been used with the same effect. As a result, the state is able to harm
children without adequate constraints on its power. The recognition and asser-
tion of a child’s enforceable constitutional right to family integrity is necessary
because, without it, courts may make decisions about what is in a child’s best
interest without hearing from the child herself, without considering and address-
ing any conflicting interests between the parent and the child, or on the basis of
an incomplete record because the parents did not or could not assert their right
to family integrity. As a result, children are often unintended victims of the legal
systems targeting their parents. In these systems, children are frequently sepa-
rated involuntarily from their families because of an allegation of neglect or
abuse, a conviction or plea leading to incarceration, or a deportation proceed-
ing against their parent. Without asserting her constitutional right to family in-
tegrity, a child has little power to stop her family’s separation.
This Article is the first to argue that children should assert their right to
family integrity in legal proceedings against their parents that could result in the
destruction of their family units. It comprehensively examines the legal, theoreti-
cal, and international law principles that support such arguments.
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INTRODUCTION
Supreme Court jurisprudence is clear that parents have a fundamental
liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children.2 Over time,
the Supreme Court expanded that interest to encompass the broader right to
preservation of the family entity;3 that is, the right of a family to make pri-
vate decisions about what is best for the family unit,4 free from unwarranted
state intervention.5 Thus, the law appreciates “the private realm of family
life which the state cannot enter.”6 This is the right to family integrity.
Scholars such as Peggy Cooper Davis argue that this right to family
integrity developed after slavery, in reaction to the routine destruction of
2 See infra Section I.B and accompanying text.
3 See infra Section I.A and accompanying text.
4 Though the author believes that families take many forms, for the purposes of this Arti-
cle, “family” is limited to immediate family members, which includes legal parents and
children.
5 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
6 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\56-2\HLC201.txt unknown Seq: 3  5-OCT-21 16:41
2021] My Family Belongs to Me 269
African American family units.7 Destroying families was “a powerful vehi-
cle of subjugation and dehumanization that could be inflicted on minority
groups.”8 In response, familial rights were developed to require heightened
constitutional protections, both procedurally and substantively.9 Family de-
struction as a tool to control disfavored minorities is still visible in our cul-
ture today. Incarceration destroys millions of families across the country. In
the immigration system, the government relentlessly separates children from
their families with no plan or procedure for their return.10 In the child wel-
fare system, better described as the family regulation system,11 minority chil-
dren are historically and continually overrepresented in foster care.12 It is
well documented that family separation disproportionately affects indigent
people and particularly indigent people of color.13
In these criminal, immigration, and family court proceedings—as well
as others not explored in this Article—a parent could potentially preserve
her family by citing the constitutional right to family integrity. The question
is whether there is a reciprocal right for children; this Article answers in the
affirmative and urges practitioners and legislators to utilize it more often.
Children’s rights theories demonstrate the importance of recognizing
this right. And while the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that a child
7 See Caitlin Mitchell, Family Integrity and Incarcerated Parents: Bridging the Divide, 24
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 175, 181–82 (2012) (citing PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STO-
RIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES 9 (1997)).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 See Joel Rose, Migrant Caregivers Separated from Children at Border, Sent Back to
Mexico, NPR (July 5, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/05/738860155/family-separations-
under-remain-in-mexico-policy, archived at https://perma.cc/6GAJ-NTYL.
11 See Dorothy Roberts, Abolishing Policing Also Means Abolishing Family Regulation,
IMPRINT (June 16, 2020), https://imprintnews.org/child-welfare-2/abolishing-policing-also-
means-abolishing-family-regulation/444809, archived at https://perma.cc/9YCA-3X3M (“I am
inspired by calls to defund the police. But I am concerned by recommendations to transfer
money, resources and authority from the police to health and human services agencies that
handle child protective services (CPS). These proposals ignore how the misnamed ‘child wel-
fare’ system, like the misnamed ‘criminal justice’ system, is designed to regulate and punish
black and other marginalized people. It could be more accurately referred to as the ‘family
regulation system.’”). The author agrees with Professor Roberts’ analysis and will use the term
“family regulation system” throughout this article instead of the more commonly used “child
welfare system.”
12 Lynn F. Beller, When in Doubt, Take Them Out: Removal of Children from Victims of
Domestic Violence Ten Years After Nicholson v. Williams, 22 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y
205, 212 (2015).
13 See, e.g., NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ROCKING THE CRADLE: ENSURING THE RIGHTS
OF PARENTS WITH DISABILITIES AND THEIR CHILDREN 79 (2012), https://ncd.gov/sites/default/
files/Documents/NCD_Parenting_508_0.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/Z7PW-AVAP (“Af-
rican American and American Indian children are more likely than other children to be re-
ported, investigated, substantiated, and placed in foster care. Thirty-one percent of the children
in foster care are African American, double the percentage of African American children in the
national population. Children of color, especially African American children and often Ameri-
can Indian children, are more likely to have longer placements in out-of-home care, are less
likely to receive comprehensive services, and are less likely to reunify with their families than
white children.”).
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could assert a constitutional interest in her family against state intervention,14
dicta has supported the argument that the this right in fact belongs to all
family members.15 And while many federal circuit courts have yet to rule on
this issue, the majority has clearly found that such a right exists.16 Finally,
international conventions support the recognition and clear assertion of this
right in legal proceedings.17
Despite this support for the existence of a child’s independent right to
family integrity, children rarely assert this right. As a result, children are
virtually shut out of legal proceedings that affect their families and stabil-
ity—usually based on allegations against their parents, not themselves. This
may be due in part to the fact that the legal landscape is not clear. But it is
also likely due to the confusing role of children’s advocates in civil proceed-
ings18 and the fact that children in many of these proceedings have no advo-
cate at all.19 If a parent fails to assert her fundamental right to her children in
those proceedings or is unable to do so because of a finding of unfitness,
family integrity may never be considered—even though the implications for
the child can be devastating. The Supreme Court has noted that “[d]irecting
the onus of a parent’s misconduct against his children does not comport with
fundamental conceptions of justice.”20 Yet the Court has not given this ob-
servation legal force by overtly recognizing a child’s right to family integrity
or clarifying its parameters.
The immigration, criminal, and family regulation systems separate
thousands of families every day.21 While these systems went unchallenged
for decades, perspectives on them are shifting. Today, many call for the abo-
lition of these systems altogether.22 There is a movement to reduce mass
incarceration, public outrage regarding immigration policy, and widespread
recognition that the family regulation system regularly overreaches. In 2020,
presidential candidates campaigned on these issues in an overt manner, the
14 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989).
15 Id. at 130–31.
16 See infra Section I.D and accompanying text.
17 See infra Section I.E and accompanying text.
18 See generally Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel
for Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1401 (1996); Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability
to Voice: Appointing Counsel for Children in Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1571,
1615 (1996).
19 See e.g., Misyrlena Egkolfopoulou, The Thousands of Children Who Go to Immigration
Court Alone, ATLANTIC (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/
08/children-immigration-court/567490/, archived at https://perma.cc/Z3BX-J8SG.
20 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982).
21 See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, Family Separation: It’s a Problem for U.S. Citizens, Too, N.Y.
TIMES (June 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/22/us/family-separation-americans-
prison-jail.html, archived at https://perma.cc/B2BJ-H7B5.
22 See, e.g., Elaine Godfrey, What ‘Abolish ICE’ Actually Means, ATLANTIC (July 11,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/07/what-abolish-ice-actually-means/
564752/, archived at https://perma.cc/BG3V-598Z; Bill Keller, What Do Abolitionists Really
Want?, MARSHALL PROJECT (June 13, 2019), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/06/13/
what-do-abolitionists-really-want, archived at https://perma.cc/M7WY-V76L.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\56-2\HLC201.txt unknown Seq: 5  5-OCT-21 16:41
2021] My Family Belongs to Me 271
likes of which we had never seen before.23 Scholars, activists, and politicians
are devising creative reforms to effect change.24
This Article advocates that a key strategy for reforming these systems is
to explicitly recognize and encourage the assertion of a child’s independent
constitutional right to family integrity. Wielding this right can save children
and families who are devastated by the separation that these systems wreak.
To be clear, a constitutional right to family integrity will not prevent
familial discord that tears families apart. It also may make no difference in
cases where parents and children are at odds and their rights conflict. In such
cases, a different standard would have to be applied.25 As such, this Article
does not examine the application of this right to private family law proceed-
ings, only the many proceedings where the family’s adversary is the state.
And while recognizing a child’s right to family integrity may not tip the
scale toward family unity in every case of state intervention, in many in-
stances it could be an extra weight in favor of preserving familial bonds.
Acknowledging and strengthening this right would allow children’s positions
to be introduced into various proceedings to prevent destruction of their
families.
Part I of the paper explores the historical, theoretical, international, and
constitutional underpinnings of the child’s right to family integrity and traces
its development through Supreme Court and federal case law.26
Part II examines the current treatment of a child’s right to constitutional
integrity in the systems that separate children from their parents most fre-
quently: the criminal, immigration, and family regulation systems. This Part
highlights the problems that result from these legal systems’ failures to rec-
ognize or correctly apply this right.27 It explores how indigent families of
23 See generally Danielle Kurtzleben, Immigration: Where 2020 Democratic Candidates
Stand on Border Crossings and More, NPR (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/12/
759442642/immigration-where-2020-democratic-candidates-stand-on-border-crossings-and-
more, archived at https://perma.cc/U9FX-GG74; 2020 Candidates Views on Criminal Justice:
A Voter’s Guide, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/2020-election/candidates-views-on-the-
issues/criminal-justice-reform/, archived at https://perma.cc/7E6B-ND5N (last updated Mar. 5,
2020); Julián Castro, Children First Plan for Foster Care, MEDIUM (Oct. 10, 2019), https://
medium.com/castro2020/children-first-plan-for-foster-care-5ee30ae46987, archived at https://
perma.cc/L5WJ-DA22.
24 See, e.g., THE MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://m4bl.org/defund-the-police; Immi-
gration Activists Call on President-Elect Biden to Enact Major Reforms After Helping Propel
Him to Victory, DEMOCRACY NOW (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.democracynow.org/2020/12/
16/headlines/immigration_activists_call_on_biden_to_enact_major_reforms_after_helping_
propel_him_to_victory, archived at https://perma.cc/US3P-WMGM; Roberts, supra note 11. R
25 There are various standards that could be applied where rights are in conflict. For exam-
ple, in custody cases where parents have equal constitutional rights, generally a “best inter-
ests” standard applies. The author takes no position on what standard is appropriate in a case
of conflict between a parent and child as an analysis of what standard is appropriate is outside
the scope of this Article and could likely be the topic of another article entirely.
26 See infra Part I.
27 See infra Part II.
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color are particularly susceptible to state intervention and could therefore
benefit most from the ability to wield a child’s right to family integrity.
Part III provides recommendations for how advocates and legislators
could better assert a child’s constitutional right to her family in order to pre-
vent state-sponsored family separation.28 It then demonstrates how children’s
rights theories and international law support using a child’s right to family
integrity to prevent state-imposed family separation.
  Part IV concludes.
I. SUPPORT FOR THE CHILD’S RIGHT TO FAMILY INTEGRITY
A. History and Theory Support a Child’s Right to Family Integrity
How to conceptualize children’s rights as a general matter has been an
area of intense debate. This Article argues for recognition of the independent
right to family integrity for children. The development of children’s rights,
through scholarship and activism during the second half of the twentieth
century, demonstrates strong theoretical and normative support for a child’s
constitutional right to family integrity. Further, surveying the movement
reveals how the traditional arguments against recognizing children’s rights—
which generally pit children’s rights against their parents’—are inapplicable
when analyzing a child’s constitutional right to family integrity. Unlike with
other rights and duties where there may be conflict, with this specific right,
overt recognition of a child’s right to protection of her family from state
interference bolsters her parents’ power rather than undermining it.
When one examines the historical development of children’s rights, mi-
nors went from having no rights to speak of to an environment where advo-
cates argue for the recognition of their independence and self-determination.
In the early 1900s, the notion of “children’s rights” was a laughable concept.
Children were considered to be the property of their parents and therefore
any rights that could possibly belong to a child really belonged to the par-
ent.29 And in reality, because women had so few legal rights themselves,
children were the property of their fathers.30 Children had no right to be
protected from harm and their parents could require them to work in any
type of environment.31 Parents decided whether their children attended
school or whether having their children in the workforce and contributing to
the family income was more important.32
28 See infra Part III.
29 Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, The Case Against Separating the Care from the Caregiver: Re-
uniting Caregivers’ Rights and Children’s Rights, 15 NEV. L.J. 236, 245 (2014).
30 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Children’s Rights: The Destruction and Promise of Fam-
ily, 1993 BYU L. REV. 497, 502 (1993).
31
MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 2 (2005).
32 Id.
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Over time, however, the law came to view children less as their parents’
possessions and more as individuals who had their own particular needs and
vulnerabilities that deserved greater protection.33 In the Progressive Era,
there was a shift in attitude to the notion that the state also shared the obliga-
tion to ensure that children were safe and their basic needs were met.34 Re-
formers successfully championed laws to end child labor and instead make
education a priority, even as opponents argued that such laws would infringe
on parental rights.35 By 1918, every state had compulsory education laws,36
and, in 1941, the Supreme Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act, which
implemented child labor standards.37
The modern children’s rights movement came into being in the 1960s
alongside the civil rights and feminist movements.38 During this period, doc-
tors were concerned about unexplained physical injuries on children that
were presumably inflicted by their caregivers. They labeled this condition
“battered child syndrome.”39 The thought of parents inflicting harm on their
children allowed for the possibility that children had their own human rights,
including a right to safety.40 Additionally, the children’s rights movement
focused on securing greater autonomy for children and releasing them from
state and parental control.41
Throughout history and into modern times, a paradox has run through
the movement for children’s rights. Under the umbrella of “children’s
rights,” some argue that children are autonomous humans who need to be
empowered, while others argue that children require heightened protection
due to their vulnerability. In the words of Martha Minow, “it remained pos-
sible to argue that young people deserve the same treatment as adults” and
also that “young people deserve special legal protections differing from the
law of adults.”42
Despite the range of theories, the position of academics on both sides of
the debate support a right to family integrity for children. Those who call for
greater independence for children—including generists who want recogni-
tion of children’s ever-expanding capacity, empowerment rights theorists
who aim to equalize power imbalances, and critics of the authorities frame-
work who resent the subjugation of children’s rights to their parents—can
appreciate that children have the power to advocate for the protection of
33 Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 29, at 246. R
34
GUGGENHEIM, supra note 31, at 1–2. R
35 Id. at 2–3.
36 Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S.
Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 550,
586–87 (1992).
37 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125–26 (1941).
38
GUGGENHEIM, supra note 31, at 5. R
39 Id. at 183.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 6.
42 Id. at 13 (citing Martha Minow, Whatever Happened to Children’s Rights?, 80 MINN. L.
REV. 267, 287 (1995)).
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their family units. On the other hand, those who argue that children are vul-
nerable due to their immaturity recognize that children first and foremost
rely on their parents to meet their needs. Thus, despite seemingly conflicting
perspectives, one can find support in these various schools of thought for
asserting a child’s constitutional right to family integrity.
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, a leading champion of the generist per-
spective, believes that the differences between children and adults are “ex-
aggerated and distorted” so that adults can discredit children’s autonomy and
independent needs.43 While she acknowledges that children aren’t born with
autonomy but rather grow to be autonomous,44 she cautions against repeating
the mistakes of viewing women as “adorable but incompetent” with chil-
dren by recognizing that children’s capacity is increasing at every moment of
their development.45 According to Bennett Woodhouse, the generist perspec-
tive “recognizes that meeting the needs of children is the primary concern of
family law . . . in which power over children is conferred by the community,
with children’s interests and their emerging capacities the foremost consider-
ation.”46 As a result, the task before adults is to “ask the child question,”
i.e., “how have children’s experiences and values been left out of the law?”47
This question helps advocates determine whether the law truly recognizes
and incorporates children’s experiences and attempts to bring children to the
forefront of legal decision-making by “listening to children’s authentic
voices, and employing child-centered practical reasoning.”48 The generist
perspective supports recognizing a child’s independent right to family integ-
rity because it would allow children’s perspectives to be introduced into pro-
ceedings that threaten to divide their families. Under this approach, clearly
recognizing a child’s right to family integrity would value children’s auton-
omy and independence by giving them a voice in legal decisions that affect
them and by allowing their experiences to become part of the decision-mak-
ing process.
After evaluating the experiences of women and people of color in their
struggles for expanded rights, Katherine Federle concluded that, in those
contexts, rights “evolve[d] from paternalistic notions of the need to protect
the weak and ignorant to recognition of capacity and autonomy.”49 There-
fore, defining rights this way, in Federle’s opinion, simply highlights chil-
dren’s weaknesses instead of giving them strength.50 As a result of this
approach, she believes children are oppressed and subordinated, likening the
43 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Par-
ents’ Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1829 (1993).
44 Id. at 1756.
45 Id. at 1829.
46 Id. at 1814–15.
47 Id. at 1838.
48 Id. at 1838–40.
49 Katherine Hunt Federle, Children, Curfews, and the Constitution, 73 WASH. U.  L.Q.
1315, 1316 (1995).
50 Id. at 1325.
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treatment of children to the historical treatment of enslaved people.51 By
contrast, Federle proposes that empowerment rights are the lens through
which we should view children’s rights. Empowerment rights “are con-
cerned with . . . equalizing power” and “enable the powerless to make
claims, to command the respect of other powerful beings, and to be treated
nonpaternalistically.”52 Acknowledging a child’s constitutional right to fam-
ily integrity empowers children in exactly the way that Federle suggests: it
equalizes children’s power in their familial relationships and enables them to
participate in meaningful ways in the systems that threaten their well-being.
It recognizes that children are not passive members of their family; they too
contribute to and receive from their families in different ways. Children
would be empowered to communicate the many losses that would befall
them, were they to be separated from their families.
Professors Anne E. Dailey and Laura A. Rosenbury recently advocated
for “The New Law of the Child,” arguing that the existing authorities frame-
work, i.e., that parents are the primary legal decisionmakers for their chil-
dren, is insufficient.53 They believe that under the authorities framework,
children are always viewed as dependents on either their parents or the state
until they are determined to be legally capable, which fails to “acknowledge
and promote the richness of children’s lives in the here and now.”54 Further,
the current framework prioritizes parents’ rights over children’s and perpetu-
ates a myth of nonintervention into families.55 Finally, they criticize the
“persistent reliance by legal actors on limited conceptions of both depen-
dency and autonomy.”56 Clarifying and recognizing a child’s right to family
integrity would allow children and parents to be on equal footing to assert
their constitutional rights to their family—or to powerfully choose to not
assert such a right. Explicit recognition of a child’s right to family integrity
allocates equivalent power to children when faced with government involve-
ment in their familial relationships.
In contrast with these approaches, Minow suggests that the “conven-
tional conception of rights as implying an autonomous person who needs
freedom from interference seems ill-suited to meeting the needs of most
children.”57 Minow argues that the correct framework is one based in human
rights rather than children’s or adults’ rights. She believes that this approach
allows us to acknowledge the differences between adults and children “to
meet children’s needs in reaching their full potential.”58 The child’s indepen-
51 See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 31, at 8 (citing Federle, supra note 49, at 1344). R
52 Federle, supra note 49, at 1326. R
53 See generally Anne C. Dailey & Laura A. Rosenbury, The New Law of the Child, 127
YALE L.J. 1448 (2018).
54 Id. at 1467.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Martha Minow, Whatever Happened to Children’s Rights?, 80 MINN. L. REV. 267, 298
(1995).
58 Id. at 295–96.
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dent constitutional right to family integrity also fits neatly into Minow’s
framework, as in our society and under our laws the responsibility for meet-
ing children’s needs is delegated to their parents. Consequently, allowing
children to assert their right to be raised by and amongst their families ac-
knowledges that parents are in the best position to meet their children’s
needs. Conversely, if a child believes that her parents are not in the best
position to meet her needs, then that perspective too can be made a part of
the calculus.
From an international perspective, the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) was specifically designed to apply to chil-
dren. Notably, the right to family integrity is embedded throughout the
CRC.59 The Preamble states that family is “the fundamental group of society
and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its mem-
bers and particularly children.”60 Article Five requires the states to respect
the “responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where applicable, the
members of the extended family or community as provided for by local cus-
tom . . . to provide . . . appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by
the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention.”61
Articles Seven through Nine more explicitly recognize a child’s right to
family integrity. Article Seven allows children “as far as possible, the right
to know and be cared for by his or her parents.”62 Article Eight establishes
that states will “respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity,
including nationality, name and family relations.”63 Finally, Article Nine
identifies the right of a child to remain with her parents, and demands “that a
child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will” and
that states “shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or
both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both par-
ents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child’s best interests.”64
The CRC therefore prioritizes a child’s right to family integrity as a funda-
mental one.
Therefore, regardless of which perspective one has on children’s rights,
a compelling argument can be made that employing and extolling a child’s
right to family integrity in various legal systems furthers that movement’s
objectives. Recognizing a child’s right to family integrity and allowing par-
ticipation in legal proceedings affecting their parents would let children’s
voices be heard, allow their needs to be met, give children more power, and
honor the fact that children are affected by state intervention into families.
59 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
CRC].
60 Id. pmbl.
61 Id. art. 5.
62 Id. art. 7.
63 Id. art. 8.
64 Id. art. 9.
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The primary objection to expanded rights for children is that more
rights for children necessarily requires fewer rights for parents. While paren-
tal rights “were not initially developed to oppose children’s rights . . . this is
how they are commonly positioned in modern times.”65 In his seminal book
What’s Wrong with Children’s Rights, Professor Martin Guggenheim cor-
rectly notes that as children’s rights developed, so too did parental privacy
rights. He states that the environment in which the children’s rights move-
ment developed “fueled, and was fueled by, a nascent societal consensus
that children were independent persons with rights of their own, even when
enforcement of those rights came at the expense of their parents.”66 As a
result, in many cases, expanding rights for children could lead to conflict
with the rights of parents, and ultimately fewer rights for parents.
But this objection does not apply when the right in question is the con-
stitutional right to family integrity asserted against a government entity that
is trying to separate a family. In that context, the child’s right to family
integrity strengthens the rights of both children and parents. It acknowledges
that “the situation of the child is both unique to being a child and, at the
same time, inseparable from the situation of the adult.”67 Unlike other con-
ceptions of children’s rights, where more autonomy for children often comes
at the expense of parental rights, when children assert their rights to family
integrity, they strengthen parental rights.
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Demonstrates the Recognition of the
Child’s Right to Family Integrity
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly found a child’s inde-
pendent right to family integrity, the right is supported by the Court’s dicta,
as well as a broader examination of its jurisprudence with respect to family
integrity.
The right for a fit parent to raise her children free from unjustified state
intervention was first acknowledged in 1923, in Meyer v. Nebraska.68 In
Meyer, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a teacher who taught
German in contravention of a post-World War I Nebraska statute prohibiting
foreign language education.69 The Court held that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause protected (among other things) the right “to estab-
lish a home and bring up children” and, consequently, the plaintiff’s “right
. . . to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their chil-
dren.”70 While the case was framed primarily in terms of parents’ right to
65 Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 29, at 252. R
66
GUGGENHEIM, supra note 31, at 183. R
67 Maria Grahn-Farley, A Child Perspective on the Juvenile Justice System, 6 J. GENDER,
RACE & JUST. 297, 299 (2002).
68 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
69 Id. at 403.
70 Id.
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control their children’s upbringing,71 there are hints that the Court was also
concerned with children’s right to receive a diverse education. For example,
the Court stated that “[i]t is well known that proficiency in a foreign lan-
guage seldom comes to one not instructed at an early age, and experience
shows that this is not injurious to the health, morals or understanding of the
ordinary child.”72
Two years later, the Supreme Court solidified a parent’s right to raise
her children in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.73 Oregon parents who wanted
their children to attend religious school successfully challenged a statute re-
quiring public schooling.74 Relying on Meyer, the Court held that the law
interfered with “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children.”75
Then, in Prince v. Massachusetts,76 the Court stated that “[i]t is cardi-
nal with us that the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obliga-
tions the state can neither supply nor hinder.”77 Although the Court ulti-
mately held that this right is not beyond regulation in the public interest, this
language planted the seeds for the idea that the constitutional interest in the
familial relationship is owed in part because a child, and therefore society,
ultimately benefits from her relationship with her parents.
Fifty-six years later, in Troxel v. Granville,78 the Court held that, since
there is a “presumption that fit parents act in their children’s best interests,
there is normally no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm
of the family to further question fit parents’ ability to make the best decisions
regarding their children.”79 The fundamental liberty interest in raising one’s
children without unjustified government interference is therefore well-estab-
lished and reflects recognition that the child’s best interests are furthered by
such liberty interest.80
The Court’s first clear application of the principle of family integrity
with respect to children, rather than their parents, was in Stanley v. Illinois81
when the Court invalidated a statute that placed children of unwed mothers
into foster care upon their mothers’ death, regardless of their fathers’ fitness
or the children’s relationship with them.82 The Court noted that the state
“spites its own articulated goals” of protecting “the moral, emotional,
71 Id. at 400.
72 Id. at 403.
73 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
74 Id. at 534.
75 Id.
76 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
77 Id. at 166.
78 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
79 Id. at 58.
80 See id.
81 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
82 Id. at 658.
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mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the com-
munity” when it separates a child from her fit parent.83 In doing so, the
Court recognized that “[t]he integrity of the family unit has found protec-
tion in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth Amend-
ment.”84 Although the right to family integrity is not enumerated, the Court
identified its foundations in many of the protections of the U.S. Constitution.
The Court continued to develop this doctrine in Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families for Equality and Reform,85 where foster parents sought to
challenge the procedure by which children were removed from their foster
care placements.86 In analyzing the rights of foster parents versus biological
parents, the Court reiterated the Meyer-Pierce line of cases discussed above
stating that the right to conceive and raise one’s children is “essential.”87 But
in discussing the special liberty interest belonging to biological parents,
Smith acknowledged the rights of the larger family in stressing the “impor-
tance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved . . . stems from
the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily associa-
tion.”88 Though not overtly, the Court suggested here that this right was not
simply limited to parents, but also extends to children.
In concurrence, however, Justice Stewart (joined by Justices Burger and
Rehnquist) wrote that:
[I]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural fam-
ily, over the objections of the parents and their children, without
some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so
was thought to be in the children’s best interest, I should have little
doubt that the State would have intruded impermissibly on the pri-
vate realm of family life which the state cannot enter.89
The very next term, Justice Stewart’s position was unanimously adopted
by the Court in Quilloin v. Walcott.90 In Quilloin, a biological father who had
never previously sought custody of his daughter challenged her stepfather’s
adoption of the child.91 The Court found that in this specific situation—
where the child was already part of an existing family unit with her
mother—the state had not acted improperly by finding that the adoption was
83 Id. at 652–53.
84 Id. at 651 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring)) (internal citations omitted).
85 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
86 Id. at 818–19.
87 Id. at 843.
88 Id. at 844.
89 Id. at 862–63 (emphasis added).
90 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
91 Id.
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in the child’s best interests.92 The Court noted in dicta, however, that it had
“little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended if a State were
to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the
parents and their children.”93 Four years after the Court decided Quilloin, it
had the opportunity to build on this language. In Santosky v. Kramer,94 the
Court went even further,95 explaining that “until the State proves parental
unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erro-
neous termination of their natural relationship.”96
Once Stanley was decided and reaffirmed in Smith and Quilloin, this
line of cases seemed to lay bare a clear recognition that the Court found
family integrity to be equal and mutual between parents and children. Thus,
by 1982, Supreme Court doctrine on this subject seemed settled, leading one
scholar to write that family integrity was “reciprocal, running both from the
child to the parent and the parent to the child . . . suggest[ing] that either
party could invoke the right, not just the parent.”97
C. Michael H. Muddies the Waters
Notwithstanding these seemingly clear pronouncements of the child’s
right to family integrity, a few years later the Court unnecessarily confused
the legal landscape. In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,98 a birth father brought a
paternity suit to establish that he was the legal father of a child born to a
woman who was then married to another man and, accordingly, that he was
entitled to visit with his daughter.99 Importantly, the daughter also sought
visitation with Michael H.100 The mother’s husband invoked his statutory
right to be recognized as the child’s sole father.101 The Court ruled against the
birth father because California law, which created a presumption that a child
born to a marriage is the legal child of the married couple, precluded such a
claim.102 However, Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion included a single sen-
tence, in dicta, noting the Court “ha[s] never had occasion to decide
whether a child has a liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in
maintaining her filial relationship.”103 This sentence arguably muddied pre-
92 See id.
93 Id. (citing Smith, 431 U.S. at 862–63 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment)).
94 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
95 See Amy E. Halbrook, Custody: Kids, Counsel and the Constitution, 12 DUKE J. CONST.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 179, 206 (2017).
96 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760 (emphasis added).
97 Kevin B. Frankel, The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Right to Family Integrity
Applied to Custody Cases Involving Extended Family Members, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 301, 319 (2007).
98 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
99 Id. at 113–15.
100 Id. at 114–15.
101 Id. at 115.
102 Id. at 124.
103 Id. at 130.
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viously clear waters, and threw into doubt a previously certain and well-
developed right for children.
But a close reading of Michael H. demonstrates that the Court was not
actually making a decision about the child’s relationship with her parent.
Since California law presumed that the child’s legal father was her mother’s
husband, Michael was a legal stranger and had no parental claim whatso-
ever.104 “The Supreme Court thus did not foreclose the possibility that a
child had a constitutional right to a relationship with her actual parent;
rather, the Court concluded that no parent-child relationship existed in that
particular case.”105 Here, consistent with the established right to family in-
tegrity, the Court felt there was no need to rule on the issue, given that the
child already had a father and had no right to maintain a relationship with
multiple fathers.106
Further, Justice Scalia’s view that the Court has never clearly decided
whether a child has a “right symmetrical with that of her parent” has not
been endorsed by a majority of the Court.107
In a notable dissent in Troxel v. Granville, Justice Stevens seemed to
address this enigmatic part of Michael H.:
While this Court has not yet had occasion to elucidate the nature
of a child’s liberty interests in preserving established familial or
family-like bonds, it seems to me extremely likely that, to the ex-
tent parents and families have fundamental liberty interests in pre-
serving such intimate relationships, so, too, do children have these
interests, and so, too, must their interests be balanced in the
equation.108
In a different and more recent context, in Obergefell v. Hodges,109
which legalized same-sex marriage, the Court adopted Justice Stevens’ posi-
tion when addressing the positive effects of marriage on children.110 The
Court noted that “marriage offers recognition, stability, and predictability to
104 Id.
105 Susan Hazeldean, Anchoring More Than Babies: Children’s Rights After Obergefell v.
Hodges, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1397, 1411 (2017).
106 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131 (“Under California law, Victoria is not illegitimate, and
she is treated in the same manner as all other legitimate children: she is entitled to maintain a
filial relationship with her legal parents.”).
107 The plurality opinion in this case was written by Justice Scalia and joined fully only by
Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justices O’Connor and Kennedy joined in all but one footnote of the
opinion that analyzed societal traditions at the “most specific level at which a relevant tradi-
tion protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.” Id. at 127 n.6.
O’Connor took issue with such a characterization, noting that it might be inconsistent with
precedent that characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights at levels of generality
that might not be “the most specific level.” Id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Lov-
ing v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94 (1987); cf. United
States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 709 (1987)).
108 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
110 See Hazeldean, supra note 105, at 1415. R
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families, and when LGBT people are excluded, their children suffer the
stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser.”111 The Court stressed
that if LGBT couples were not permitted to marry, their children would be
“relegated through no fault of their own to a more difficult and uncertain
family life.”112 As Susan Hazeldean argues, Obergefell implies that “a
child’s most important right is to live with her parents in families that are
legally protected and secure.”113 That is, children have a right to family
integrity.
D. Other Federal Law Recognizes the Child’s Right to Family Integrity
Despite the confusion the Court caused in Michael H., at this time the
Second,114 Fourth,115 Fifth,116 Seventh,117 Ninth,118 and Tenth119 Circuits agree
with Justice Stevens and have recognized that a child possesses an indepen-
dent right to family integrity. The First, Third, and Eighth Circuits are silent
on the issue. And while the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits are also silent, dis-
trict courts in those circuits have recognized the right.120 No federal court of
appeals has explicitly held that this right does not exist. Arguably, then, the
111 Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 668 (internal quotations omitted).
112 Id.
113 Hazeldean, supra note 105, at 1407. R
114 Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977).
115 Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 346 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that delay in
reunification of a family by child welfare actors “implicates the child’s interests in his family’s
integrity and in the nurture and companionship of his parents”).
116 Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 923 (5th Cir. 2000).
117 Berman v. Young, 291 F.3d 976, 983 (7th Cir. 2002), as amended on denial of reh’g
(June 26, 2002) (stating that “[p]arents have a fundamental due process right to care for and
raise their children, and children enjoy the corresponding familial right to be raised and nur-
tured by their parents”); Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1018 (7th Cir. 2000) (same).
118 Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other
grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (“[The]
constitutional interest in familial companionship and society logically extends to protect chil-
dren from unwarranted state interference with their relationships with their parents. The com-
panionship and nurturing interests of parent and child in maintaining a tight familial bond are
reciprocal, and we see no reason to accord less constitutional value to the child-parent relation-
ship than we accord to the parent-child relationship.”).
119 J.B. v. Washington Cnty., 127 F.3d 919, 925 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omit-
ted); see also de Robles v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 485 F.2d 100, 102 (10th Cir. 1973)
(acknowledging that a child has a right to family integrity but rejecting the argument that
deportation violates that right).
120 See, e.g., Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 809 F. Supp. 2d
754, 776 (N.D. Ohio 2011), aff’d and remanded, 724 F.3d 687 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The Court
finds, therefore, that the Kovacic children have met their burden of demonstrating a constitu-
tionally protected interest in their family integrity.”); Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 218
F.R.D. 277, 297 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (“Similarly, this Court finds that once the state has removed
a child from his or her family, it cannot deliberately and without justification deny that child
the services necessary to facilitate reunification with his or her family, when safe and appropri-
ate, without violating the child’s right to family integrity.”). But see LeFever v. Ferguson, 2013
WL 1324299 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 28, 2013) (“Based upon the briefs of the parties and the Court’s
own research, it does not appear that the Sixth Circuit has recognized a § 1983 claim based
upon a minor child’s Fourteenth Amendment right to family integrity, at least in the manner
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majority rule in the United States is that children may invoke a due process
right to family integrity to prevent the destruction of their families.
Even before Michael H. was decided, when adjudicating cases where
the state removed children from their parents, several circuit courts explicitly
stated that children have an independent right to family integrity, relying on
Stanley v. Illinois121 and Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equal-
ity and Reform.122 In the first of these cases, Duchesne v. Sugarman,123 a
mother filed a civil rights lawsuit under § 1983 seeking damages against the
family regulation administration who removed her children without her con-
sent, a hearing, or a court order.124 In finding that there was a constitutional
violation, the Second Circuit stated:
This right to the preservation of family integrity encompasses the
reciprocal rights of both parent and children. It is the interest of the
parent in the companionship, care, custody and management of his
or her children and of the children in not being dislocated from the
emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily asso-
ciation, with the parent.125
In a similar case, where parents brought a § 1983 action against chil-
dren’s services workers for removing their children without a court order, the
Fifth Circuit cited Duchesne for the basic proposition that the right to family
integrity exists.126 It noted that “the right of the family to remain together
without the coercive interference of the awesome power of the state” is the
“most essential and basic aspect of familial privacy.”127 In 2000, the Fifth
Circuit, again relying on Duchesne, more clearly stated in a custody case
that “a child’s right to family integrity is concomitant to that of a parent.”128
And even after Michael H., the Second Circuit has repeatedly reiterated this
finding that “children have a parallel constitutionally protected liberty inter-
est in not being dislocated from the emotional attachments that derive from
the intimacy of daily family association.”129
In another § 1983 case seeking damages against a family regulation
agency for an alleged unconstitutional removal, the Seventh Circuit unequiv-
ocally stated that just as “[p]arents have a fundamental due process right to
that Alex would have this Court recognize it (i.e., a constitutional right to be raised by his
natural mother).”).
121 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
122 431 U.S. 816, 840–41 (1977) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570–71
(1972)).
123 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977).
124 Id. at 825.
125 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
126 Hodorowski v. Ray, 844 F.2d 1210, 1216 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Duchesne, 566 F.2d
at 825).
127 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
128 Wooley v. City of Baton Rouge, 211 F.3d 913, 923 (5th Cir. 2000).
129 Southerland v. City of New York, 680 F.3d 127, 142 (2d Cir. 2011), as amended (May
14, 2012) (quoting Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 759 (2d Cir. 2000)).
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care for and raise their children, . . . children enjoy the corresponding famil-
ial right to be raised and nurtured by their parents.”130
In the Fourth Circuit, in another case where the state unlawfully re-
moved children from their parents for several days without judicial review,
the court noted that procedural “delay implicates the child’s interest in his
family’s integrity and in the nurture and companionship of his parents.”131
Relying on this language in another constitutional challenge to a child’s re-
moval, the Tenth Circuit stated that “[t]he forced separation of parent from
child, even for a short time, represents a serious impingement upon both the
parents’ and child’s rights.”132
Accordingly, relying on Supreme Court dicta—and despite Michael
H.—the majority of federal courts of appeals have determined that a child
has a constitutional right to family integrity.
E. International Law Provides Additional Support for a Child’s Right to
Family Integrity
International law supports recognition and invocation of the child’s
right to family integrity. As a general methodology, when determining
whether a right exists, “the [Supreme] Court has expanded its general sub-
stantive due process analysis by looking not only at whether the right is
rooted in the nation’s history and tradition, but by considering whether the
right sought has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many
other countries.”133 Thus, international law may be used to advocate for
greater participation in these proceedings and larger recognition of the
child’s right to family integrity.
The international perspective on children’s rights is best summarized by
the CRC, given that every country in the world has ratified it other than the
United States.134 Though the United States has not ratified the CRC, it has
signed it, which creates an obligation to avoid actions that would defeat the
larger goals of the Convention.135 The CRC treats children as “agents who
130 Berman v. Young, 291 F.3d 976, 983 (7th Cir. 2002), as amended on denial of reh’g
(June 26, 2002); Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1018 (2000).
131 Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 346 (4th Cir. 1994).
132 J.B. v. Washington Cnty., 127 F.3d 919, 925 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations
omitted).
133 Alison M. Osterberg, Removing the Dead Hand on the Future: Recognizing Citizen
Children’s Rights Against Parental Deportation, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751, 769 (2009)
(internal quotations omitted). But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“The Court’s discussion of these foreign views . . . is therefore meaningless dicta.
Dangerous dicta, however, since this Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or
fashions on Americans.”) (internal quotations omitted).
134 Sarah Mehta, There’s Only One Country that Hasn’t Ratified the Convention on Chil-
dren’s Rights: US, ACLU (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/human-rights/treaty-rati-
fication/theres-only-one-country-hasnt-ratified-convention-childrens, archived at https://
perma.cc/6TCB-ULPU.
135 Grahn-Farley, supra note 67, at 299–300. R
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share the power to shape their own lives” and fully and actively participate
in society.136 Article Twelve of the CRC gives children the right to express
their views freely in any matter that affects them and the right to participate
in any legal proceeding that affects them.137 Further, under the same Article,
children have a right to necessary information for them to determine what
those views are, and also the right to withhold their views if they so
choose.138 A child’s wishes are one factor to be considered when making
decisions regarding that child.139
In South Africa, criminal courts must consider the effect of sentencing
a parent on that parent’s child, including the child’s best interest and how the
child will be taken care of.140 Similarly, Article Eight of the Council of Eu-
rope’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedom includes a right to protection from interference “by a public au-
thority with the exercise of” the right to private and family life.141 When
discussing sentencing for parents, the Court of Appeal Civil Division in En-
gland interpreted Article Eight to mean that children also have the right to
family life, a right that is affected by the sentencing of their parents.142 Fur-
ther, as noted, Article Twelve of the CRC allows children the opportunity to
be heard in situations that affect them.143
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
(“AFCRWC”) expressly addresses children of incarcerated mothers. The
AFCRWC states that the law must “provide special treatment to expectant
mothers and to mothers of infants and young children” and requires that “a
non-custodial sentence will always be first considered when sentencing such
mothers.”144 Further, it must “establish and promote measures alternative to
institutional confinement for the treatment of such mothers,” and prohibits
the death penalty for mothers.145
Finally, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, to which the United States is a party, requires mea-
136 Soo Jee Lee, Note, A Child’s Voice vs. A Parent’s Control: Resolving A Tension Be-
tween the Convention on the Rights of the Child and U.S. Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 687,
692–93 (2017) (quoting Lotem Perry-Hazan, Freedom of Speech in Schools and the Right to
Participation: When the First Amendment Encounters the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, 2015 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 421, 422 (2015)).
137 CRC, supra note 59, art. 12; see Lee, supra note 136, at 693–94. R
138 CRC, supra note 59, art. 12; see Lee, supra note 136, at 694. R
139 Lee, supra note 136, at 695. R
140 M v. The State Ctr. for Child L. 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC) at 245 para. 32 (S. Afr.).
141 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8,
Sept. 3, 1953, E.T.S. No. 005; see Chesa Boudin, Children of Incarcerated Parents: The
Child’s Constitutional Right to the Family Relationship, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 77,
88 (2011).
142 Boudin, supra note 141, at 89 (citing R v. Sec’y of State [2001] EWCA (Civ) 1151 R
[83] (Eng.)).
143 CRC, supra note 59, art. 12; see Grahn-Farley, supra note 67, at 330. R
144 Boudin, supra note 141, at 86. R
145 Id.
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sures to eradicate state-sponsored racial bias.146 In ratifying this convention,
the U.N. Committee noted that “[t]he majority of federal, state and local
prison and jail inmates in the United States are members of ethnic or na-
tional minorities, and that the incarceration rate is particularly high with re-
gard to African-Americans and Hispanics.”147 The same is true of children in
foster care.148 The Committee also noted that the Convention requires mem-
ber countries “to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its
forms, including practices and legislation that may not be discriminatory in
purpose, but in effect.”149 If the child’s constitutional right to family integrity
is recognized in legal systems, it would be a pathway to reducing the dispa-
rate impact of these systems on children of color.
Legal precedent, children’s rights theories, and international conven-
tions demonstrate that the right to family integrity is an individual right that
belongs to all members of the family150 and that children have the right to be
“raised[,] nurtured, and sheltered by their parents and [possess the] legal
status and standing to assert constitutional, tort and other claims against the
state for all wrongs that are caused by separation from parental care.”151
Asserting this right as described could lend legal support to the millions
of families facing destruction of their family units due to state involvement.
Strengthening the right to family integrity “will combine the rights of par-
ents and children, and it will ensure that a family will be free from unjusti-
fied interference by the State.”152
146 Grahn-Farley, supra note 67, at 326. R
147 Id. at 327.
148 Shanta Trivedi, The Harm of Child Removal, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 523,
534–41 (2019).
149 Grahn-Farley, supra note 67, at 326 n.165. R
150 See, e.g., Joan C. Bohl, Family Autonomy vs. Grandparent Visitation: How Precedent
Fell Prey to Sentiment in Herndon v. Tuhey, 62 MO. L. REV. 755, 764 (1997) (“The resulting
conception of the family is of a self-contained unit, independent of state control and so wholly
reciprocal that parents and children ‘may maintain the suits of each other, and justify the
defense of each other’s person.’”); Pamela McAvay, Families, Child Removal Hearings, and
Due Process: A Look at Connecticut’s Law, 19 QLR 125, 137 (2000) (“Besides the interest in
family integrity that children reciprocally share with their parents . . . children have a protected
interest in remaining with their parents.”); Jacinta Patterson, The Massachusetts Care and Pro-
tection System: Is A Low Tolerance for Risk Really in the Best Interest of Children?, 22 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 165, 167 (2013) (“[T]he state’s overuse of the foster care system coupled with
its lack of oversight has resulted in the systematic violation of children’s constitutional rights
to safety and family integrity”); Orly Rachmilovitz, Achieving Due Process Through Compre-
hensive Care for Mentally Disabled Parents: A Less Restrictive Alternative to Family Separa-
tion, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 785, 814 (2010) (“This ruling is highly under-protective of both
parents’ rights to the custody of their children and their interest in receiving mental health
services, as well as children’s right to family integrity.”).
151 Lawrence G. Albrecht, Human Rights Paradigms for Remedying Governmental Child
Abuse, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 447, 448 (2001).
152 John C. Duncan, Jr., The Ultimate Best Interest of the Child Enures from Parental
Reinforcement: The Journey to Family Integrity, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1240, 1287 (2005).
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II. THE CHILD’S RIGHT TO FAMILY INTEGRITY IN THE FAMILY
REGULATION, CRIMINAL, AND IMMIGRATION SYSTEMS
As established above, while the Supreme Court has not ruled on the
specific issue of whether a child has an independent right to family integrity,
dicta in multiple cases supports the argument that such a right should be
recognized.153 Relying on this dicta, many courts of appeals have accord-
ingly ruled that children have an independent right to their families because
their interest in remaining with their families is equal to their parents’ inter-
est. If this right were recognized as fundamental, the state would be required
to have a compelling interest and use narrowly tailored means when it seeks
to intervene in a family in a way that infringes upon it.154
This section analyzes how courts currently treat (or fail to treat) a
child’s right to family integrity in the legal systems that are primarily respon-
sible for state disruption of the family unit—the family regulation, immigra-
tion, and criminal legal systems—and describes the disparate impact these
systems have on marginalized communities. In so doing, it demonstrates
that, while the state interests may be compelling in some of these cases, the
means are not always narrowly tailored. This is due to the unnecessary harm
that family separation inflicts on children. Asserting a child’s right to family
integrity in these proceedings reminds the court that there are multiple con-
stitutional rights at issue and may therefore prevent the infliction of unneces-
sary harm.
A. Family Regulation
Family regulation law is perhaps the most fertile ground to explore the
right to family integrity. Nowhere else in the law is there such a direct battle
between the right of a parent to direct the care, custody, and control of her
child155 and the state’s role as parens patriae.156 The asserted justification for
such an adversarial posture is the safety and well-being of the child. This
section will interrogate that assumption.
In Stanley v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that the state cannot pre-
sume parental unfitness—it must prove it.157 The Supreme Court has also
articulated a presumption that fit parents act in the best interest of their chil-
dren.158 Further, the Court has made clear that, until and unless there is a
finding of unfitness, parents and children both share an interest in preserving
153 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130–31 (1989).
154 See Natalie Lakosil, The Flores Settlement: Ripping Families Apart Under the Law, 48
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 31, 48–49 (2018).
155 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
156 Jeanne M. Kaiser, Finding a Reasonable Way to Enforce the Reasonable Efforts Re-
quirement in Child Protection Cases, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 100, 106–07 (2009).
157 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658.
158 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000) (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,
602 (1979)).
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their familial relationship.159 Consequently, prior to any unfitness finding, all
family members hold the right to family integrity and can assert it.160 How-
ever, once a parent has been adjudicated unfit, “the court may assume at the
dispositional stage that the interests of the child and the natural parents do
diverge.”161 At this point, parents no longer hold the power to assert their
rights to care, custody, and control of their children or their right to family
integrity. In many cases, after a finding of unfitness, the parents’ rights to
their children will be terminated permanently and, in most cases,
irreversibly.
Under the Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”), if a child has
been in foster care for fifteen out of the preceding twenty-two months, the
state must begin the process of terminating her parent’s rights.162 This is true
regardless of the relevance of the required services (such as parenting classes
in a case involving allegations of domestic violence) to the allegations
against the parent163 or the parents’ actual ability to fulfill the conditions that
the state has placed on her in order to reunite with her children.164 As a
result, there are over 400,000 children in foster care,165 124,000 of whom are
awaiting adoption.166 Over half of the children who are awaiting adoption are
legal orphans,167 meaning that their parents’ rights to them have been termi-
nated, yet they have no prospects for adoption.168 Therefore, many children
have not only lost their family of origin, they have also lost family
altogether.
This is true despite the fact that these family regulation proceedings are
one of the only civil matters where children are generally provided with
advocates.169 However, as Martin Guggenheim has pointed out, the right to
159 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982).
160 See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–69.
161 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760 (emphasis in original).
162 LaShanda Taylor Adams, Backward Progress Toward Reinstating Parental Rights, 41
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 507, 512 (2017).
163 See Esme Noelle DeVault, Reasonable Efforts Not So Reasonable: The Termination of
the Parental Rights of A Developmentally Disabled Mother, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
763, 775 (2005).
164 See, e.g., id. at 787 (noting that services are not tailored for parents with disabilities);
Stephanie Sherry, When Jail Fails: Amending the ASFA to Reduce Its Negative Impact on
Children of Incarcerated Parents, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 380, 385 (2010) (“Incarceration makes it
difficult to complete the case plan created to help families reunify since they cannot participate
in many of the services required.”).
165 Foster Care, CHILD.’S RTS., https://www.childrensrights.org/newsroom/fact-sheets/fos-
ter-care/, archived at https://perma.cc/KW5T-QMWL.
166 Exec. Order No. 13,930, 85 Fed. Reg. 38,741 (June 24, 2020).
167 Id.
168 See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of
Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care—An Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM.
L.Q. 121, 137 (1995).
169 Amy Mulzer & Tara Urs, However Kindly Intentioned: Structural Racism and Volun-
teer CASA Programs, 20 CUNY L. REV. 23, 35–36 (2016).
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be represented does not mean the right to be heard.170 Further, it “does not
mean that all children are actually represented by counsel in these proceed-
ings, nor does it mean that when counsel are appointed that they are well
trained, adequately compensated, or highly motivated”171 in all cases, al-
though many are dedicated and highly-skilled. As Guggenheim,172 Jean Koh
Peters,173 and others174 have argued, children should direct their representa-
tion, and their lawyers should advocate the child’s position in court unless
those children are non-verbal or incompetent due to disability.
In family regulation proceedings, most children want to stay connected
to their parents, even parents who have perhaps transgressed.175 If a child
expresses a desire to maintain her family integrity, children’s advocates have
a responsibility to raise this constitutional argument—particularly at the
stage of family regulation proceedings where parents have been adjudicated
unfit and the family is on a path to permanent destruction. Such an approach
would be constitutionally sound, allowing consideration of more narrowly
tailored means to achieve safety of the child.
B. Immigration
Nowhere has the importance of family integrity been more visible re-
cently than in immigration law due to the ongoing family separation crisis.176
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) has separated over 5,500
170 See generally Martin Guggenheim, The Right to Be Represented but not Heard: Reflec-
tions on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76 (1984).
171 David R. Katner, Coming to Praise, Not to Bury, the New ABA Standards of Practice
for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
103, 105–06 (2000).
172 Guggenheim, supra note 170, at 78. R
173 Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering
for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1505, 1508 (1996)
(“[T]he advocacy default—the lawyer should initially attempt to advocate for the position
expressed by his client. The lawyer may deviate from these default positions only when inde-
pendent evidence, that is, evidence not arising exclusively within the lawyer-client relation-
ship, such as psychological, educational, and psychiatric evaluations, demonstrate that the
default position is erroneous . . . .”).
174 See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Bernardine Dohrn, Foreword: Children and the Ethical
Practice of Law, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1295 (1996) (“If the child can direct the repre-
sentation, however, the lawyer has the same ethical obligations as the lawyer would have when
representing an adult.”).
175 See Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: Standards
for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care,
and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623, 639–40 (1976).
176 See Miriam Jordan & Caitlin Dickerson, U.S. Continues to Separate Migrant Families
Despite Rollback of Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/09/
us/migrant-family-separations-border.html, archived at https://perma.cc/QWL2-6LXR; Pris-
cilla Alvarez, ACLU Says over 900 Children Separated from Families at US Border Since Last
Summer, CNN (July 30, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/30/politics/900-children-sepa-
rated-border/index.html, archived at https://perma.cc/AW8C-A4XQ; see also Nathaniel
Weixel, Government Watchdog Details Severe Trauma Suffered by Separated Children, HILL
(Sept. 4, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/459899-government-watchdog-details-se-
vere-trauma-suffered-by-separated-children, archived at https://perma.cc/MP5D-72BJ.
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children from their families at the United States-Mexico border since the
spring of 2018.177 Over 1,000 of these children were under the age of ten at
the time of separation.178
“Protecting children and their interests is not a priority of immigration
law,”179 nor does the immigration system aspire to protect the integrity of
families.180 Due process guarantees, however, apply to all persons on U.S.
soil, regardless of their immigration status.181 Therefore, both those who
have legal status and those who do not can and should invoke fundamental
rights like the right to family integrity.182 Despite the state’s compelling in-
terest in enforcing immigration laws, the state’s means must be narrowly
tailored to achieve that end.
Importantly, under immigration law, the only relationship that is gener-
ally recognized for purposes of trying to obtain legal status is the parent-
child relationship, not the child-parent one. That is, a parent with legal status
may be able to confer legal status on her child, but the child does not have a
similar ability to create legal status for her parent.183 This is because the
system’s goal is to “assimilate children’s status to that of their parents, not
the other way around.”184 In this way, children’s rights are extremely limited,
and this has major effects on their ability to maintain their family units if
they want to do so on U.S. soil.
In a high-profile case challenging the Trump administration’s zero-toler-
ance family separation policy, the ACLU’s complaint stated that
“[p]laintiffs, their children, and all class members have liberty interests
under the Due Process Clause in remaining together as families.”185 The
plaintiffs framed the issue as a right to family integrity that belonged to both
parents and children. In its decision analyzing the substantive due process
interest, however, the district court only framed the right as belonging to the
parents.186 The court cited Troxel v. Granville for the proposition that a par-
177 See John Washington, Family Separations at the Border Constitute Torture, New Re-
port Claims, INTERCEPT (Feb. 25, 2020), https://theintercept.com/2020/02/25/family-separa-
tions-border-torture-report/, archived at https://perma.cc/4PM6-EABJ.
178 Family Separation: By the Numbers, ACLU (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/is-
sues/immigrants-rights/immigrants-rights-and-detention/family-separation, archived at https://
perma.cc/ZZ2A-AW78.
179 David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child Relation-
ship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165, 1180 (2006).
180 See Shani M. King, U.S. Immigration Law and the Traditional Nuclear Conception of
Family: Toward A Functional Definition of Family That Protects Children’s Fundamental
Human Rights, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 509, 509 (2010).
181 S. Adam Ferguson, Not Without My Daughter: Deportation and the Termination of
Parental Rights, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 85, 92 (2007).
182 Id.
183 Thronson, supra note 179, at 1181. R
184 Id. at 1182.
185 Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 14, Ms. L. v. U.S.
Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1149 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 18-cv-00428-DMS-
MDD).
186 See Ms. L., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 1161–65.
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ent’s right to care, custody, and control of her children was a well-estab-
lished fundamental liberty interest and did not analyze a right to family
integrity belonging to the children.187
The court stated that the inquiry was: “(1) whether the substantive due
process right to family integrity applies not to Plaintiffs, generally, but in the
particular circumstances alleged; and (2) if so, whether the conduct attrib-
uted to the Government violates that right.”188 In finding that the right to
family integrity applied to the facts at issue, the court noted that the plain-
tiffs asserted that they were separated from their children without any find-
ing that they were unfit or unable to safely care for their children.189 Thus,
the court found that the right to family integrity limited the enforcement of
immigration laws in this case because parents were separated from their chil-
dren, and not necessarily the other way around.190 Although the plaintiffs
posed the right to family integrity as one belonging to all members of the
family, the court’s constitutional analysis was based exclusively on the par-
ents’ rights. Many subsequent decisions followed suit, conducting constitu-
tional analysis based solely on parental rights, rather than children’s rights.191
In the First Circuit case of Payne-Barahona v. Gonzáles,192 the court
stated that “deportations of parents are routine and do not of themselves
dictate family separation,” in part because children could be relocated to live
with their families in their home countries.193 In Payne-Barahona, the court
surveyed other circuits that confronted this issue, finding that all uniformly
held that deportation did not violate any constitutional rights belonging to
children.194 Some of these decisions did not explicitly refer to the right to
family integrity, but all referred to constitutional rights.195 But at least one
187 Id. at 1161.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 1165.
190 See id.
191 See, e.g., M.G.U. v. Nielsen, 325 F. Supp. 3d 111, 120 (D.D.C. 2018) (“There is no
question that defendants have directly and substantially burdened Ms. E.F.’s [parental] right to
family integrity.”); Jacinto-Castanon de Nolasco v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 319 F.
Supp. 3d 491, 501 (D.D.C. 2018) (“The separation imposed by defendants absolutely pre-
cludes Ms. Jacinto-Castanon’s involvement in any aspect of her sons’ care, custody, and con-
trol, from religion to education. And the forced separation prevents her from expressing love
for, and comfort to, her sons—comfort that they surely need as they endure the bewildering
experience of detention.”).
192 474 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007).
193 Id. at 2–3.
194 Id. at 2–4.
195 See, e.g., Gallanosa ex rel. Gallanosa v. United States, 785 F.2d 116, 120 (4th Cir.
1986) (“We agree with the reasoning of these courts and, accordingly, conclude that the Galla-
nosas’ deportation could violate no constitutional rights enjoyed by Kathryn by virtue of her
United States citizenship.”); Cortez-Flores v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 500 F.2d 178,
180 (5th Cir. 1974) (“[D]eportation of a parent does not deprive the child of any constitu-
tional rights.”); Gonzalez-Cuevas v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 515 F.2d 1222, 1224 (5th
Cir. 1975) (“Legal orders of deportation to their parents do not violate any constitutional right
of citizen children.”).
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rejected the explicit argument that deportation violated a child’s right to fam-
ily integrity.196
In another case, the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that deportation
could trigger a violation of a child’s constitutional rights, explaining that
those who “illegally remained in the United States for the occasion of the
birth of their citizen children, cannot thus gain favored status over those
aliens who comply with the immigration laws of this nation. Any ruling
which had this effect would stand those statutes on their heads.”197
Further, in a challenge to the law preventing those under twenty-one
from giving immigration privileges to their parents under the Immigration
and Nationality Act, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that children are not in a
position to determine the location of their family home, as Congress recog-
nized by limiting the ability to confer immigration benefits to those over the
age of twenty-one.198 Under current law, therefore, minors have no right to
sponsor their parents for legal immigration.199 And although unaccompanied
minors might be able to petition for legal status for themselves, if they are
able to obtain it, it is unlikely that they would then be able to petition for
their families to join them in the United States.200
Even in the few cases where a court found a constitutional right to
family integrity for children, this right was deemed insufficient to prevent
negative immigration consequences. For example, the Northern District of
California stated that “[i]t is well-settled that children have a liberty interest
in living with their parents.”201 That court cited a Ninth Circuit decision that
found that the right to live with one’s family is “a right that ranks high
among the interests of the individual and that cannot be taken away without
procedural due process.”202 Yet the court found no support for the notion that
this interest could overcome legitimate immigration enforcement measures
that resulted in a family member’s removal from the United States.203
Based on the rationale that, as a minor, a child cannot make decisions
on behalf of her family, immigration law gives children fewer rights than
their parents. This approach suggests that, under immigration law related to
deportation, children’s opinions should not be a consideration in determining
where to live—even in cases where the children were born in the United
States. As discussed, international conventions like the CRC require that
196 de Robles v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 485 F.2d 100, 102 (10th Cir. 1973).
197 Gonzalez-Cuevas, 515 F.2d at 1224. This is a direct quote. The author does not endorse
the use of the term “alien” to describe those without legal immigration status unless necessary
because it reflects language from a statute, opinion, or other authority.
198 Perdido v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 420 F.2d 1179, 1181 (5th Cir. 1969).
199 See Thronson, supra note 179, at 1185. R
200 Id. at 1187.
201 Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1117 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
202 Id. at 1117–18 (quoting Ching v. Mayorkas, 725 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 2013)).
203 See id. at 1118.
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children have the right to participate and be heard in legal proceedings that
affect them.204 The U.S. approach to immigration must therefore be wrong.
C. Criminal Law
In the criminal setting, the right to family integrity often clashes with
the state’s police powers. As we can see from the millions of families sepa-
rated by incarceration, the state usually wins.205
Approximately five million children living today—7% of the American
child population—have had a parent incarcerated in state or federal prison.206
So many children in the United States have incarcerated caregivers that Ses-
ame Street created content to help children deal with the consequences.207
And unlike in the family regulation system, where courts still have a man-
date to maintain relationships between children and parents who have strug-
gled, criminal courts may separate children from even excellent parents
without ever considering the consequences to those children.208
In some cases, the status of being a parent is actually used against a
defendant. Criminal courts routinely issue orders of protection against par-
ents in cases of domestic violence and child endangerment so that parents
are denied contact with their children—all before criminal guilt is estab-
lished.209 Given the reputational (and, in most states, electoral) risks for a
judge who fails to issue an order of protection if harm later befalls a child,
when prosecutors request such an order—and prosecutors usually will—
judges grant them.210 Judges are understandably terrified of receiving nega-
tive attention in the press or, in the worst case scenario, being blamed for a
child’s death.211 As David Jaros argues, “[w]hile the state’s interest in pro-
tecting children from harm is compelling, order of protection statutes that
grant judges limitless discretion to separate parents from their children are
simply too broad to withstand strict scrutiny.”212 Yet, orders of protection
continue to separate parents from their children in criminal courts across the
country.
204 See Lee, supra note 136, at 693–94. R
205 See Sarah Abramowicz, A Family Law Perspective on Parental Incarceration, 50 FAM.
CT. REV. 228, 230–31 (2012).
206 Teresa Wiltz, Having a Parent Behind Bars Costs Children, States, PEW STATELINE
(May 24, 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/05/
24/having-a-parent-behind-bars-costs-children-states#:~:text=staggering%20Numbers,accord-
ing%20to%20the%20Casey%20Foundation, archived at https://perma.cc/KL3Z-7DP8.
207 Serena Larkin, Sesame Workshop Materials Help Families Affected by Incarceration,
U. WIS.-MADISON NEWS (June 12, 2020), https://news.wisc.edu/sesame-workshop-materials-
help-families-affected-by-incarceration/, archived at https://perma.cc/Z5Y6-AMHF.
208 Abramowicz, supra note 205, at 231. R
209 David Michael Jaros, Unfettered Discretion: Criminal Orders of Protection and their
Impact on Parent Defendants, 85 IND. L.J. 1445, 1447–49 (2010).
210 Id. at 1457–58.
211 Id. at 1458–59, 1458 n.77.
212 Id. at 1466.
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And even before adjudication, parental status is generally not a consid-
eration in determining whether pre-trial detention is required, or whether or
how high to set bail.213 Parenthood is also not a required consideration in
sentencing or parole.214 Courts often want to hear from and are typically
most swayed by the victim and the victim’s family, not the family of the
accused.215 In determining whether a person should be paroled, the parole
board makes that decision without hearing about the effect that separation
has had on the family and children in particular.216 Thus, a parent could be
condemned to incarceration without the court receiving any information
about the effects it would have on a blameless child.
Children suffer the stigma of having an incarcerated parent, which can
cause shame and social isolation.217 Further, if the parent is the only
caregiver, the child could be placed into foster care, which can lead to ex-
tremely poor long-term outcomes including a higher likelihood of becoming
involved in the criminal legal system herself.218 Additionally, once a parent
is incarcerated, opportunities for continued contact are limited. Correctional
facilities may be located far from the incarcerated person’s family and home,
and visitation hours may be infrequent or inconvenient.219 Women sentenced
under federal law are particularly vulnerable to these problems because there
are fewer federal facilities for women.220 Visitation may therefore be impos-
sible due to expense or limited transportation options, resulting in many chil-
dren being unable to see their parents regularly, if at all.221
If a child is in foster care, given strict federal time limits regarding
termination of parental rights, termination is a near certainty for many par-
ents. Under federal law, if a child is in foster care for fifteen out of twenty-
two months, the state must move towards termination proceedings.222 And
while the law does require the states to make “reasonable efforts” towards
reunification, what is considered “reasonable” is generally a very low bar.223
Incarcerated parents are rarely in a position to complete the plans designed
by family regulation agencies, providing the state with an excuse for deny-
213 Zina Makar, Unnecessary Incarceration, 98 OR. L. REV. 607, 646–47 (2020); Tamar
Lerer, Sentencing the Family: Recognizing the Needs of Dependent Children in the Adminis-
tration of the Criminal Justice System, 9 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 24, 28–29 (2013).
214 Boudin, supra note 141, at 82. R
215 See 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 533 (4th
ed. 2021).
216 See Mary West-Smith et al., Denial of Parole: An Inmate Perspective, 64 FED. PROB. 3,
7–8 (2000).
217 Deseriee A. Kennedy, Children, Parents & the State: The Construction of a New Fam-
ily Ideology, 26 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 78, 93 (2011).
218 Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Child Protection and Child Outcomes: Measuring the Effects of
Foster Care, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1583, 1599 (2007).
219 Abramowicz, supra note 205, at 231. R
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E).
223 Kennedy, supra note 217, at 104–07. R
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ing reunification.224 Further, in many jurisdictions, incarceration is a factor
that that weighs in favor of termination.225
Thus, at any stage of the criminal system where parents are detained,
there is rarely consideration of the fact that the defendant is a parent, and
that incarceration of that parent necessarily will have negative impacts on
her children. In fact, in our current system, many courts will never even hear
from or about these children. If children were able to employ their constitu-
tional right to family integrity in these cases, judges might reconsider pre-
trial detention, diversion, or even an ultimate sentence.
D. Impact on Marginalized Communities
Our legal systems disproportionately impact low-income communities
of color.226 Professor Lenese Herbert draws parallels between today’s gov-
ernmental intrusions into African American families and the invasions dur-
ing slavery.227 She states that “African American parents did not bargain for
this minimal slice of citizenry; yet, their fundamental ability to parent suc-
cessful Americans and healthy citizens of the world becomes, at best, com-
promised if not destroyed.”228
Marginalized communities wield the least power in these systems as
they face significant barriers based on language,229 limited access to coun-
sel,230 fewer and lower quality educational231 and job opportunities, less ac-
cess to mental health and drug treatment services,232 race-based policing,233
and systemic bias at every phase of adjudication.234
224 Deseriee A. Kennedy, “The Good Mother”: Mothering, Feminism, and Incarceration,
18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 161, 175 (2012).
225 Id. at 175–76.
226 See generally ELISA MINOFF, CTR. FOR STUD. SOC. POL’Y, ENTANGLED ROOTS: THE
ROLE OF RACE IN POLICIES THAT SEPARATE FAMILIES 11 (2018), https://cssp.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/11/CSSP-Entangled-Roots.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/4FVE-5GHG.
227 Lenese Herbert, Plantation Lullabies: How Fourth Amendment Policing Violates the
Fourteenth Amendment Right of African Americans to Parent, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COM-
MENT. 197, 232 (2005).
228 Id.
229 Doris Correa Capello, Recruiting Hispanic Foster Parents: Issues of Culture, Lan-
guage, and Social Policy, 87 FAM. SOC’Y: J. CONTEMP. SOC. SERV. 529, 529–35 (2006).
230 See Peter A. Joy, Unequal Assistance of Counsel, 24 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 518,
519–24 (2015).
231
MINOFF, supra note 226, at 11 (“[H]alf of black children with parents who have lower R
educational achievement experienced parental imprisonment by the age of fourteen.”).
232 Id. at 16; Nora Volkow, Access to Addiction Services Differs by Race and Gender,
NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (July 16, 2019), https://www.drugabuse.gov/about-nida/noras-
blog/2019/07/access-to-addiction-services-differs-by-race-gender, archived at https://perma.cc
/697X-E982.
233 Herbert, supra note 227, at 200. R
234 See MINOFF, supra note 226, at 16; Kennedy, supra note 217, at 87; Jessica Dixon, The R
African-American Child Welfare Act: A Legal Redress for African-American Disproportional-
ity in Child Protection Cases, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 109, 110 (2008).
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For example, in the family regulation system, Black, Latinx, and Native
American children are disproportionately represented.235 For Native Ameri-
can children, this is true even after the introduction of heightened protections
for that population.236 Families of color are more likely to become involved
with the family regulation system, more likely to have their children re-
moved, and, once removed, less likely to be reunified.237
At the border, over 6,000 children have been separated from their par-
ents.238 As of November 2020, the government could not locate the parents
of over 650 of these children.239 These children are primarily from Latin
American countries.240 The former president referred to immigrants as “ani-
mals”241 and “rapists.”242 In determining immigration policy, he referred to
their native countries as “shitholes.”243
And in the criminal system in 2008, one in nine African American chil-
dren and one in twenty-eight Latinx children had an incarcerated parent,
versus one in fifty-seven white children.244 Forty percent of incarcerated par-
ents are Black fathers.245 And “[i]f we consider the full continuum of the
criminal [legal] process—arrest, pre-trial detention, conviction, jail, proba-
tion, imprisonment, and parole—the number of children affected is signifi-
cantly larger.”246
235 Trivedi, supra note 148, at 534–41. R
236 Virginia Drywater-Whitekiller, Family Group Conferencing: An Indigenous Practice
Approach to Compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act, 8 J. PUB. CHILD WELFARE 260,
260 (2014).
237 Trivedi, supra note 148, at 538–39. R
238 See Washington, supra note 177. R
239 Jacob Soboroff & Julia Ainsley, Lawyers Can’t Find the Parents of 666 Migrant Kids,
a Higher Number than Previously Reported, NBC NEWS (Nov. 9, 2020), https://
www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/lawyers-can-t-find-parents-666-migrant-kids-higher-
number-n1247144, archived at https://perma.cc/YYX3-VBJR; Caitlin Dickerson, Parents of
545 Children Separated at the Border Cannot Be Found, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/10/21/us/migrant-children-separated.html, archived at https://
perma.cc/JP4X-S73F.
240 See Soboroff & Ainsley, supra note 239. R
241 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Calls Some Unauthorized Immigrants ‘Animals’ in Rant,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/16/us/politics/trump-undocu-
mented-immigrants-animals.html, archived at https://perma.cc/VR7J-E56S.
242 Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Donald Trump’s False Comments Connecting Mexican Immi-
grants and Crime, WASH. POST (July 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps-false-comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-
crime, archived at https://perma.cc/WYN8-AA2U.
243 Josh Dawsey, Trump Derides Protections for Immigrants from ‘Shithole’ Countries,
WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-attacks-protec-
tions-for-immigrants-from-shithole-countries-in-oval-office-meeting/2018/01/11/bfc0725c-
f711-11e7-91af-31ac729add94_story.html, archived at https://perma.cc/7AJ6-9YB5.
244 Wiltz, supra note 206. R
245
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON ECO-
NOMIC MOBILITY 18 (2010), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/
pcs_assets/2010/collateralcosts1pdf.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/Y8J8-AXE9.
246 Eric Martin, Hidden Consequences: The Impact of Incarceration on Dependent Chil-
dren, NAT’L INST. JUST. J., Mar. 2017, at 2, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250349.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/L3NP-H35Q.
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Parents of color must fight against societal stereotypes about them, par-
ticularly with respect to race, poverty, and class.247 Due to perceptions that
these parents are less than “ideal,” they have an even harder task of con-
vincing caseworkers and judges that they are “good” or even appropriate
parents.248 When faced with incarceration or involvement in the family regu-
lation or immigration system, these biased perceptions can be fatal.
In addition to the effects of being separated from their caregivers, the
damage the criminal legal system inflicts on their communities also harms
children.249 For example, arrest and deportation of immigrants leads to fear
in immigrant and particularly Latinx communities, causing pervasive stress
that can threaten children’s health and well-being.250 Since minority men are
more likely to be stopped by the police, arrested, and incarcerated, their
children are more likely to be shackled with the trauma of these
experiences.251
It is clearly not a coincidence that minorities are overrepresented in all
of these systems. Data supports the contention that people of color are vic-
tims of racism in our legal systems.252 Weaponizing the child’s constitutional
right to family integrity for marginalized children would be one powerful
way to fight the racism that is inherent in these systems and that causes
destruction of their families.
III. USING A CHILD’S INDEPENDENT RIGHT TO FAMILY INTEGRITY TO
EFFECT CHANGE
Relying on the foundation in constitutional and international law out-
lined above, many courts have explicitly recognized that children have an
autonomous right to their familial relationships. The Ninth Circuit best sum-
marized this view:
[T]his constitutional interest in familial companionship and soci-
ety logically extends to protect children from unwarranted state
interference with their relationships with their parents. The com-
panionship and nurturing interests of parent and child in maintain-
ing a tight familial bond are reciprocal, and we see no reason to
247 Kennedy, supra note 224, at 185. R
248 Id. at 185–86.
249 See Grahn-Farley, supra note 67, at 326–28. R
250
MINOFF, supra note 226, at 9. R
251
AKIVA M. LIBERMAN & JOCELYN FONTAINE, URB. INST., REDUCING HARMS TO BOYS
AND YOUNG MEN OF COLOR FROM CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM INVOLVEMENT 2 (2015), https://
www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/39551/2000095-Reducing-Harms-to-Boys-and-
Young-Men-of-Color-from-Criminal-Justice-System-Involvement.pdf, archived at https://
perma.cc/885D-PP9Y.
252 Liyah Kaprice Brown, Officer or Overseer?: Why Police Desegregation Fails as an
Adequate Solution to Racist, Oppressive, and Violent Policing in Black Communities, 29
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 757, 761–64 (2005).
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accord less constitutional value to the child-parent relationship
than we accord to the parent-child relationship.253
However, while many jurisdictions have explicated the child’s right to
family integrity, the right is still underutilized. This Part explores how advo-
cates and scholars could better employ this right to support families in dif-
ferent legal systems to minimize family separation.
A. The Family Regulation System
In the family regulation system, ASFA contains many provisions that
violate a child’s constitutional right to family integrity. While the state inter-
est in protecting children is likely compelling, the means—presumptive fam-
ily separation—are not narrowly tailored to achieve the result as
constitutionally required.254 These provisions should be challenged on consti-
tutional grounds and should be stricken or substantially modified.
For example, ASFA contains multiple provisions promoting “perma-
nency,” which is one of the law’s major goals.255 Proponents argue that these
provisions are necessary to ensure that children are not left in foster care
indefinitely with no path to a stable family life.256 It is clear, however, that
permanency with foster parents (who have no constitutional right to family
integrity) is the priority, rather than maintaining unity with the biological
family.257 ASFA also makes clear that, in addition to permanency, “health
and safety” are primary goals.258 While these are laudable aspirations, con-
stitutionally, as applied in the statute, they are not narrowly tailored to meet
the goals of safety and permanency with respect to each child as an
individual.
Another ASFA provision offers the states financial incentives for adop-
tion, but does not contain similar incentives for reunification.259 While ASFA
requires “reasonable efforts” towards reunification once a child is removed
from her home, “reasonable efforts” has never been clearly defined, leading
to poor implementation and little effect in practice.260 Further, the state can
have concurrent goals of reunification and adoption.261 But only one of these
253 Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987).
254 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment
‘forbids the government to infringe . . . “fundamental” liberty interests at all, no matter what
process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.’”) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
255 Trivedi, supra note 148, at 559. R
256 See id.
257 Id.
258 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A).
259 See EMILIE STOLTZFUS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43025, CHILD WELFARE: STRUCTURE
AND FUNDING OF THE ADOPTION INCENTIVES PROGRAM ALONG WITH REAUTHORIZATION IS-
SUES 5 (2013).
260 Trivedi, supra note 148, at 558–59. R
261 Smith v. Org. of Foster Fams. for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 843 (1977).
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has financial incentives: adoption. A legal approach that prioritizes pushing
families towards termination as opposed to strengthening family bonds vio-
lates the child’s right to family integrity.
To comply with the right, Congress should amend ASFA to create simi-
lar if not greater incentives for reunification as it currently does for adop-
tion.262 In cases where the state cannot identify an adoptive family, ASFA
should permit termination proceedings to be delayed so there is no scenario
where a child is left without legal parents. Further, in that scenario, ASFA
should require the state to continue reasonable efforts towards reunification,
rather than proceeding with termination.
ASFA also contains several exceptions where the state is not required to
make reasonable efforts whatsoever.263 When “aggravated circumstances” or
other enumerated criteria exist, the government need not make any efforts to
preserve the child’s relationship with her current family.264 Such circum-
stances include murder, sexual abuse of another child of the parent, and prior
termination of the parent’s right to another child.265 Congress made clear,
however, that the examples of aggravated circumstances listed in ASFA
were simply that—examples—and that states were free to decide the types
“of adult behavior that makes it unnecessary . . . unwise . . . [or] simply
wrong for the Government to make continued efforts to send children back
to their care.”266
In many states, the term “aggravated circumstances” is not defined in a
way that gives courts guidance as to when reasonable efforts should be ex-
cused.267 Children’s advocates warned that another vaguely defined term
would create a volatile environment that would be harmful for children.268
They were concerned that if no reasonable efforts are required from the
state, there will be no support for the family’s efforts to address the underly-
ing issues that lead to the child’s removal.269 Further, “vagueness of the ag-
gravated circumstances exception contributes to the likelihood that life-
altering decisions will be arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory.”270 But
above all else, an approach that determines the steps a state must take with
respect to one child based on conduct related to another child is not narrowly
tailored and therefore violates this child’s constitutional right to her family
integrity. These exceptions should therefore be stricken from ASFA.
262 See H. Elenore Wade, Note, Preserving the Families of Homeless and Housing-Inse-
cure Parents, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 869, 891–93 (2018).
263 Trivedi, supra note 148, at 558–59; 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D). R
264 Trivedi, supra note 148, at 559. R
265 Id. at 558–59; 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i)–(iii).
266 Kathleen S. Bean, Aggravated Circumstances, Reasonable Efforts, and ASFA, 29 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 223, 237 (2009).
267 Id. at 225–27.
268 Id.
269 Id. at 226.
270 Id. at 226–27.
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In addition to challenges to ASFA and the state laws promulgated under
it, asserting a child’s constitutional right to family integrity in family regula-
tion proceedings can also be effective in reducing the harm to children. This
is particularly true in Termination of Parental Rights (“TPR”) cases at a
stage where a parent has already been adjudicated unfit. As noted, the pres-
ence of children in foster care for fifteen out of twenty-two months requires
TPR proceedings.271 TPR has been called “the family law equivalent of the
death penalty”272 due to the finality and severity of the decision.
While children’s attorneys participate in TPR proceedings, they should
recognize and assert their position of strength in advocating for their client’s
position since at the point of a TPR, there has already been a finding of
unfitness against the parent.273 Therefore, the presumption that a parent is
acting in a child’s best interest no longer applies, and parents no longer have
the ability to assert their constitutional interest in raising their children. Chil-
dren, however, do retain that ability and it is their last chance to protect their
family unity. And while children already have the right to participate in
these proceedings, and in most jurisdictions are appointed an advocate who
will speak on their behalf in court,274 there is “tension between parental
rights and the best interests of minor children, primarily because of the con-
flict between the policy goals of child protection and the sharply defined
rights of parents.”275 That is, the stated goal of the “child welfare” system is
to protect children from harm, which may involve the state attempting to
remove children from their parents. This state action conflicts with a parent’s
fundamental right to care, custody, and control of her child. Averring a
child’s right to family integrity puts the child and parent’s interests in their
family on equal footing against the state’s intervention, instead of pitting the
parent’s right against the child’s, thereby undermining them both.276
Powerfully asserting children’s constitutional rights to their relation-
ships with their parents would strengthen children’s litigation positions in
these proceedings, no matter what they are. Children could raise objections
to termination as a violation of their constitutional rights. Alternatively, a
child could choose to waive her constitutional right in support of an adop-
tion, if that is what the child wants. Clarifying the fact that this right has
constitutional weight equal to the right the parent held prior to termination
would make these arguments more forceful rather than framing these argu-
ments solely in terms of a child’s desire or best interests. If a child were to
support termination and desired the freedom to be adopted, the waiver of the
271 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E).
272 In re Smith, 601 N.E.2d 45, 55 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
273 Guggenheim, supra note 168, at 135. R
274 Mulzer & Urs, supra note 169, at 33–38. R
275 John Thomas Halloran, Families First: Reframing Parental Rights As Familial Rights
in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 51, 77
(2014).
276 Id.
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right to family integrity could speak volumes to the court and could weigh
heavily against the parent.
If there is successful termination, and the legal relationship between
parent and child is severed, ordinarily there is no post-termination contact
because the parent no longer has a right to a relationship with her child.
While termination may be thought of as representing “a child’s newfound
freedom from her past and her readiness for a rebirth of sorts, through adop-
tion, in a new family,” in reality, even for very young children, their connec-
tions to their birth families do not magically evaporate once parental rights
are legally severed.277 Using their own constitutional right to family integ-
rity, children could advocate for post-termination contact on the basis that
their parent’s constitutional rights to family integrity may have been termi-
nated, but not the child’s. Many states have statutes that permit judicial dis-
cretion to allow parents and children to have contact even after termination;
other states recognize a right to petition for such contact.278
These laws recognize that post-termination contact is often in a child’s
best interest.279 This contact may help ease the grief that could follow from
termination and make the experience more positive.280 Practically, it would
also allow birth parents and foster or adoptive parents to exchange medical
information, family history, and other useful information about the child.281
Additionally, depending on the child’s placement, continued contact with the
parent could provide a source of “racial, cultural, ethnic, or religious knowl-
edge and experiences” that may otherwise be lacking.282 Overall, “the con-
tinuing bond with a biological parent, as long as it is not harmful, can be
important for providing continuity, identity and security.”283 Termination of
a parent’s rights does not necessarily mean that the parent and child cannot
have a positive relationship.284 And regardless of termination, many children
continue to see their parents once they are adults.285 Children’s advocates
should use their clients’ constitutional right to family integrity to argue that
even if the child no longer has a legal relationship with her family, she could
benefit from the emotional attachments286 to her biological family, as well as
the benefit of “our most cherished values, moral and cultural.”287 This is
277 Alexis T. Williams, Rethinking Social Severance: Post-Termination Contact Between
Birth Parents and Children, 41 CONN. L. REV. 609, 613 (2008).
278 Id. at 626–27.
279 See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 29, at 268. R
280 See Williams, supra note 277, at 618. R
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 29, at 267. R
284 Williams, supra note 277, at 618. R
285
CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELA-
TIONSHIPS 85 (2014).
286 Id. at 18, 85.
287 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977).
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particularly true for children who are “legal orphans,” whose parents’ rights
to them have been terminated, but who are also not on a path to adoption.288
Further, in many states, children are able to petition for reinstatement of
their parents’ rights.289 Given the reality that many children are not adopted
after their parents’ rights are terminated and are instead left as legal orphans
with no real plan for stability,290 when permanency is not achieved through
adoption, it is only logical that children and parents should have another
opportunity to reunify.291 This approach recognizes that children have a right
to family integrity and should have the ability to request that the right be
respected. Thus, to be constitutionally compliant, all states should allow
children to petition for reinstatement of their parents’ rights, post-
termination.292
B. Immigration Law
While a child’s right to family integrity might be recognized in the im-
migration context, a “family unity” theory of due process seems “implausi-
ble” because “no authority has been identified to suggest that the
Constitution provides alien petitioners with a fundamental right to reside in
the United States simply because other members of their family are citizens
or lawful permanent residents.”293 Meanwhile, there are scores of cases that
say the opposite, i.e., that immigration decisions that result in a family being
separated by deportation do not violate any constitutional rights.294 Immigra-
288 See Guggenheim, supra note 168, at 134. R
289
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PA-
RENTAL RIGHTS 11–12, 18, 20, 23, 28, 40, 46, 50, 64, 66–67 (2016), https://
www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/groundtermin.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/BHW2-
TXGL (summarizing statutes from California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana,
Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin that allow
children to petition for reinstatement of their parents’ rights under certain circumstances).
290 Adams, supra note 162, at 515. R
291 Id. at 516.
292 The author believes that parents should also be able to petition for reinstatement of
their parental rights. This article is simply arguing for reforms which could be supported by a
child’s right to family integrity.
293 Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (quoting De Mercado
v. Mukasey, 566 F.3d 810, 816 n.5 (9th Cir. 2009)).
294 Id. (citing Gebhardt v. Nielsen, 879 F.3d 980, 988 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that a U.S.
citizen’s due process rights were not violated by the denial of non-citizen wife and her chil-
dren’s visa petitions based on his own sex offense because “the generic right to live with
family is ‘far removed’ from the specific right to reside in the United States with non-citizen
family members,” and holding that “a fundamental right to reside in the United States with
[one’s] non-citizen relatives” would “run[ ] headlong into Congress’ plenary power over im-
migration”)); see Morales-Izquierdo v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 600 F.3d 1076, 1091 (9th Cir.
2010) (holding that “lawfully denying Morales adjustment of status does not violate any of his
or his family’s substantive rights protected by the Due Process Clause” even “when the impact
of our immigration laws is to scatter a family or to require some United States citizen children
to move to another country with their parent”), overruled in part on other grounds by Garfias-
Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); cf. De Mercado v. Mukasey, 566
F.3d 810, 816 n.5 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating, in dicta, that the “family unity” theory of due
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tion courts should prioritize a child’s constitutional right to her family and
acknowledge that deportation of a parent, in most situations, will mean de-
portation of the child as well.
Law professor Bridgette A. Carr has argued that the “best interests”
standard of child custody should be applied to immigration law.295 Given that
most international and domestic court proceedings involving children use
this standard, a “best interests” approach is well-supported296 and more con-
sistent with the idea of family integrity. What is most important is an ap-
proach that at a fundamental level “prioritizes the child’s safety,
permanency, and well-being.”297 The best interests approach incorporates a
child’s right to family integrity because the law generally recognizes that it is
in a child’s best interest to remain with her parents unless the parent is un-
fit.298 And deportability does not necessarily indicate unfitness.299
The only area of immigration law that already recognizes the best-inter-
ests standard is Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (“SIJS”) cases.300 SIJS is
an immigration classification available to undocumented children under
twenty-one who have been neglected, abused, or abandoned by a parent. In
order for the child to acquire Lawful Permanent Resident status in a SIJS
case, the child must be eligible for foster care, and the court must determine
that it is not in the child’s best interests to return to her home country.301
Thus, in applying this standard in SIJS cases, because the child would neces-
sarily be separated from one or both parents, the court must make a determi-
nation that reunification with one or both of them is not in the child’s best
interest.302
Canadian immigration law could serve as a model for how a best inter-
ests analysis could be applied in the United States in other immigration con-
texts. Canada integrates a best interests analysis when a parent is facing
removal and the child has legal status.303 Although Canadian law only allows
the parent to apply for permanent residency through a humanitarian and
compassionate relief process, when considering such a request, part of the
process in the immigration context is “implausible” because “no authority [has been identi-
fied] to suggest that the Constitution provides [alien petitioners] with a fundamental right to
reside in the United States simply because other members of their family are citizens or lawful
permanent residents”).
295 Bridgette A. Carr, Incorporating a “Best Interests of the Child” Approach into Immi-
gration Law and Procedure, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 120, 124 (2009).
296 Id.
297 Id. at 127.
298 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000).
299 See C. Elizabeth Hall, Where are My Children . . . and My Rights? Parental Rights
Termination as a Consequence of Deportation, 60 DUKE L.J. 1459, 1464–66 (2011).
300 Sarah Rogerson, Lack of Detained Parents’ Access to the Family Justice System and the
Unjust Severance of the Parent-Child Relationship, 47 FAM. L.Q. 141, 157 (2013).
301 Carr, supra note 295, at 136; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).
302 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).
303 Carr, supra note 295, at 147–48. R
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required analysis is “the best interests of the child directly affected.”304 Once
the parent becomes a permanent resident, there is a pathway to citizenship.305
In offering guidance for how to analyze these cases, the Canadian Fed-
eral Court of Appeal stated that the determination requires consideration of
the benefits that would flow to the child if her parent remained in Canada
and the hardship the child would suffer if her parents were deported or she
were forced to leave in order to live with her parents.306 A child’s right to her
family recognizes that “[s]uch benefits and hardship are two sides of the
same coin, the coin being the best interest of the child.”307
In these proceedings in Canada, the child is appointed a best interests
representative. Such a representative “must be over eighteen years old, be
able to appreciate the nature of the proceedings, be willing and readily able
to represent the child, and not have a conflict of interest with the child.”308
Importantly, for accompanied children, the representative is usually her par-
ent, but if there is a conflict or the parent is otherwise unable to serve as a
representative, another adult may be appointed.309 An even better approach
to allow the child to assert her right to family integrity would be to appoint
the child an attorney. Many have documented the absurdity of children, in-
cluding toddlers, appearing in court without representation.310 Children have
a “statutory right to a reasonable opportunity to present their case”311 and a
constitutional right to family integrity. Children cannot realistically exercise
these rights without advocates.312
Additionally, in those American cases where a parent is granted relief
and the child is allowed to stay based on the parent’s relief, there is no indi-
vidual determination of the merits of the child’s case. Children’s claims
should be considered individually because usually by the time the parent
learns that her case is denied, the deadline has passed for discovery and
submitting evidence to the court on the child’s case. Carr’s proposed solution
is to stay the parent’s removal order until the child brings a new proceeding
on her own behalf,313 which is made possible by the fact that Canadian law
requires a separate determination for children, even if the claim is heard in
conjunction with the parent’s.314
304 Id.
305 Understand Permanent Resident Status, GOV’T OF CAN. (Sept. 17, 2019), https://
www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/new-immigrants/pr-card/under-
stand-pr-status.html, archived at https://perma.cc/D46A-LGD8.
306 Carr, supra note 295, at 147–48. R
307 Id.
308 Id. at 150.
309 Id. at 146–47.
310 Carr, supra note 295, at 147–48; Egkolfopoulou, supra note 19. R
311 McKayla M. Smith, Scared, But No Longer Alone: Using Louisiana to Build A Nation-
wide System of Representation for Unaccompanied Children, 63 LOY. L. REV. 111, 115–16
(2017).
312 Id. at 116.
313 Carr, supra note 295, at 151. R
314 Id. at 147.
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The approach used in Canada integrates consideration of a child’s right
to family integrity. It allows a court to consider that, if a parent is deported, a
child is also de facto deported.315 And while Canada’s system does not guar-
antee that a parent will not be deported or even that the children’s best inter-
ests will prevail, it does allow flexibility so that deserving cases not
otherwise anticipated by other immigration legislation may be approved.316
This gives decisionmakers the ability and opportunity to acknowledge that it
is difficult to find a one-size-fits-all approach in these complicated scenarios.
As the Canadian system recognizes, “consideration of both the benefit to the
child if the parent were not removed and the hardship the child would suffer
if only the parent were removed or if the child accompanied the parent”317 is
fundamental to an examination of the child’s best interests.318 Given that
family integrity is generally in a child’s best interests, the United States
should approach removal decisions in a way that “prioritizes the child’s
safety, permanency, and well-being,” as Carr suggests.319
Another major barrier to family unity under immigration law is that,
with limited exceptions, people under twenty-one cannot sponsor a relative
for immigration status.320 Thus, U.S. citizens are unable to get legal process
for their relatives who are seeking immigration status in this country. The
current approach is based on the idea that parents determine migration but
“in a growing number of cases, it is children who provide or have the poten-
tial to provide the migration stability—children who would, but for the
asymmetry just mentioned, have the right to establish family unity around
them.”321 Thus, young American citizens are forced to choose between their
families and the benefits of living in the United States. Citizen children,
DREAMers, and children granted asylum should be able to sponsor their
parents and immediate family members, with the assistance of an attorney.322
And children who are granted SIJS should be able to sponsor the non-of-
fending parent. While opponents may argue that this does not comport with
the goals of the immigration system, one asserted goal is, in fact, family
integrity.323 As Justice Douglas once noted in dissent:
The citizen is a five-year-old boy who was born here and who,
therefore, is entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities
which the Fourteenth Amendment bestows on every citizen. A
315 Lori A. Nessel, Deporting America’s Children: The Demise of Discretion and Family
Values in Immigration Law, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 605, 609–12 (2019).
316 Carr, supra note 295, at 148. R
317 Id. at 152.
318 Becky Wolozin, Doing What’s Best: Determining Best Interests for Children Impacted
by Immigration Proceedings, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 141, 152 (2016).
319 Carr, supra note 295, at 127. R
320 Anita Ortiz Maddali, Left Behind: The Dying Principle of Family Reunification Under
Immigration Law, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 107, 170 (2016).
321 Id. at 138.
322 Id. at 170–71.
323 Osterberg, supra note 133, at 783. R
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five-year-old boy cannot enjoy the educational, spiritual, and eco-
nomic benefits which our society affords unless he is with his
parents.324
Some may argue that policies such as those suggested incentivize par-
ents to violate immigration law and come to this country illegally and then
have children in an attempt to stay here. The derogatory “anchor baby”325
narrative that dominates anti-immigration rhetoric326 is simply a myth. For
example, one study showed that more than half of the children born in 2009
to parents without legal immigration status were born to families who had
lived in America for at least five years.327 Their mothers therefore did not
cross the border dragging their pregnant bellies, or move here to immedi-
ately have children who could ease their path to citizenship.328 Having a
child in the desired country does not even guarantee immigration status to
the parent. Between 1998 and 2007, 108,434 parents of American citizen
children were deported.329 And in Canada, even with the best interests ap-
proach, many courts determine that what is in the best interest of the child is
to return to the home country with the parent.330
Further, at a fundamental level, “visiting . . . condemnation on the head
of an infant is illogical and unjust . . . [and] contrary to the basic concept of
our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility or wrongdoing.”331 Punishing a child for her parent’s alleged
offense is antithetical to our core values. In a country that values immigra-
tion and recognizes the value that immigrants bring to our community, it is
important to acknowledge that a smoother transition for all family members
means that immigrants are able to adapt faster and succeed. When we create
barriers such as family separation, even if there is eventual reunification,
problems and disruptions are inevitable—and, as noted above, create lasting
harm.332
324 Id. at 760 (citing Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72, 79 (1957) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).
325 Mariana E. Ormonde, Debunking the Myth of the “Anchor Baby”: Why Proposed Leg-
islation Limiting Birthright Citizenship Is Not A Means of Controlling Unauthorized Immigra-
tion, 17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 861, 863 (2012) (“The term ‘anchor baby’ is often used
to describe a child born in the United States to unauthorized immigrant parents, conveying the
notion that through the child’s birth the immigrant birth parents can ‘anchor’ themselves to the
United States and reap the benefits of American citizenship.”)
326 See Louis Jacobson, Fact-Checking the Claims about ‘Anchor Babies’ and Whether
Illegal Immigrants ‘Drop and Leave,’ POLITIFACT (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.politifact.com/
truth-o-meter/statements/2010/aug/06/lindsey-graham/illegal-immigrants-anchor-babies-birth-
right, archived at https://perma.cc/2T9Y-PSVX.
327 Ormonde, supra note 325, at 877. R
328 Id.
329 Id. at 879.
330 See Carr, supra note 295, at 157–58. R
331 Osterberg, supra note 133, at 783–84 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982)). R
332 See Maddali, supra note 319, at 163. R
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C. The Criminal Legal System
Millions of parents are incarcerated in America, leaving their children
with relatives, friends, in foster care, or worse.333 In the words of Professor
Maria Grahn-Farley:
Two million adult people deprived of their liberty means two mil-
lion fewer adult people available to function as parents, caretakers,
and support systems in the lives and the communities of the chil-
dren of the United States. It is not only punishment of the adults; it
is also punishment of the children in the mostly black [sic] com-
munities from which the adults are taken.334
In many of these cases, people are incarcerated pre-trial and are pre-
sumed innocent.335 Further, many have pled guilty to crimes because of the
pressures inherent in our legal system.336 In these cases, although the chil-
dren themselves are not accused of any crime, their constitutional right to
family integrity has been implicated by their parents’ incarceration.  Thus,
the child should be heard, or at least treated in the same manner as other
children whose familial bonds have not been disrupted by the state.337 While
some courts do take caregiving responsibilities into account, others do not,
and there is no uniformity across jurisdictions.338 Additionally, courts tend to
consider what the parent did, rather than what a child might need.339 The
constitutional right to family integrity requires that a child’s rights to her
parents be considered at every stage of criminal proceedings that could result
in family separation.
The strongest argument against incorporating consideration of family
ties in the criminal system is that the state is simply punishing the parent for
a choice that that parent made, and there should be no consideration of third
parties. But the system already considers many third-party interests, most
notably those of victims and their families.340 Moreover, prosecutors proudly
proclaim that they represent “the people.”341 Children—even children of the
accused—are a necessary part of that constituency.
333 See Grahn-Farley, supra note 67, at 307. R
334 Id.
335 See Zina Makar, Displacing Due Process, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 425, 430 (2018) (noting
significant amount of pre-trial arrestees).
336 Id. at 443; see also Somil Trivedi & Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve, To Serve and Protect
Each Other: How Police-Prosecutor Codependence Enables Police Misconduct, 100 B.U. L.
REV. 895, 915–16 (2020).
337 Note, On Prisoners and Parenting: Preserving the Tie That Binds, 87 YALE L.J. 1408,
1418 (1978).
338 Lerer, supra note 213, at 44. R
339 Id. at 26.
340 Id. at 27.
341 Abbe Smith, Can You Be A Good Person and A Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 355, 356 (2001).
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More importantly, the child too is punished. As parens patriae, the
state has a responsibility to consider reducing harm to the child, regardless
of how the harm has occurred.342 As scholars like Sarah Abramowicz have
noted, because “[t]he state has made a decision to delegate childrearing to
individual parents, an arrangement that children have no choice over[, t]he
state therefore shares responsibility for harms to children that follow from its
treatment of their parents.”343
This is true at all stages of the criminal process where judges determine
whether a person should be incarcerated: pre-trial, sentencing, and parole.
One illustrative study in Connecticut found that almost 60% of the people
who were arrested and detained in 2017 were parents, which is consistent
with the national average.344 Further, over half of these parents provided the
financial support for their children and 64% of mothers and 43% of fathers
lived with their children.345 Three-quarters of the mothers were single
parents.346
At bail hearings, the court must determine whether to release a defen-
dant pre-trial and if so, under what conditions.347 If the judge decides that
pre-trial detention is necessary, the court often also determines how high to
set bail or denies it altogether.348 At these bail hearings prosecutors tend to
argue the “nature and circumstances of the charges, the weight of the evi-
dence, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the nature and
seriousness of any threat the defendant’s release may pose to the commu-
nity.”349 The defense focuses its arguments on factors such as the “accused’s
personal character” and “ties to the community.”350 Given the astronomical
rates of pre-trial detention in America, judges are clearly finding these de-
fense arguments less persuasive.351
Given that pre-trial detention infringes on a child’s constitutional right
to family integrity, courts should be required to analyze the impact of pre-
342 See United States v. Cox, 271 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1089–90 (S.D. Iowa 2018) (“To that
end, this Court concludes that, in fashioning a sentence . . . the welfare of a defendant’s chil-
dren must be fully considered. Whether that consideration is mitigating or aggravating depends
entirely upon the factual circumstances of each case. But courts cannot simply ignore the best
interests of a defendant’s family and the defendant’s responsibilities to his or her family. Chil-
dren of defendants are as much stakeholders in a sentence as the victims, the public, and the
defendants themselves.”).
343 Abramowicz, supra note 205, at 236. R
344 See CONN. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
ON PRETRIAL RELEASE AND DETENTION IN CONNECTICUT 54 (Feb. 2017), https://www.ct.gov/




347 Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework for Compensating Pretrial Detainees,
26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 1960 (2005).
348 Id.
349 Id. at 1961.
350 Id.
351 Makar, supra note 335, at 427. R
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\56-2\HLC201.txt unknown Seq: 43  5-OCT-21 16:41
2021] My Family Belongs to Me 309
trial detention on any children of the accused. And while, arguably, courts
may consider family relationships in their analysis of “ties to the jurisdic-
tion” in determining whether the defendant is a flight risk or how high to set
bail, this does not frame the analysis from the point of view of the child and
the impacts on her.
Chesa Boudin, the son of incarcerated parents who was recently elected
District Attorney of San Francisco,352 attempts to “reframe the problem of
third-party harm to children from current sentencing law and prison visita-
tion policy through the lens of children’s rights, rather than the traditional
frame of prisoners’ rights.”353 He suggests that children should be able to
participate in their parents’ sentencing.354 And within days of his election,
Boudin announced a diversion program for parents charged with certain
crimes who are primary caregivers to minor children.355
Guidance on the federal sentencing guidelines notes that “family ties
and responsibilities” are “not ordinarily relevant” to warrant a potential de-
parture from the recommended sentencing range.356 Generally, “downward
departure based on family ties and responsibilities should be the exception
rather than the rule.”357 Despite this, some circuits have taken extraordinary
family circumstances into account in sentencing. For example, in United
States v. Johnson,358 the Second Circuit considered the defendant’s status as a
single mother to several young children as well as the caregiver to the child
of her daughter with special needs.359 The court reasoned that:
The rationale for a downward departure here is not that [the defen-
dant’s] family circumstances decrease her culpability, but that we
are reluctant to wreak extraordinary destruction on dependents
who rely solely on the defendant for their upbringing. [The trial
court judge] made it clear that the departure was not on behalf of
the defendant herself, but on behalf of her family.360
The Johnson court noted that courts had consistently held that family
circumstances did not generally warrant a departure from sentencing guide-
352 See Evan Sernoffsky, Chesa Boudin, reformer public defender, wins election as San
Francisco’s new DA, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 9, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/arti-
cle/Chesa-Boudin-reformer-public-defender-wins-14823166.php, archived at https://perma.cc/
GE3V-78HJ; Tim Arango, Dad’s in Prison, Mom Was on Parole. Their Son Is Now Running
for D.A., N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/24/us/chesa-boudin-
san-francisco-da.html, archived at https://perma.cc/X8ME-92R8.
353 Boudin, supra note 141, at 79. R
354 Id.
355 Evan Sernoffsky, SF District Attorney Chesa Boudin Launches Diversion Program for
Parents Facing Criminal Charges, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.sfchronicle.com/
crime/article/SF-District-Attorney-Chesa-Boudin-launches-14975839.php, archived at https://
perma.cc/NB2X-AXZ7.
356 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 95 (1996).
357 United States v. Sweeting, 213 F.3d 95, 100 (3d Cir. 2000).
358 964 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1992).
359 Id. at 129.
360 Id.
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lines, citing the Eleventh Circuit, which held that “[h]ere [defendant] has
shown nothing more than that which innumerable defendants could no doubt
establish: namely, that the imposition of prison sentences normally disrupts
. . . parental relationships.”361 Yet the court felt that family circumstances
could be extraordinary, constituting proper grounds for reducing a sen-
tence.362 To a child, the removal of her parent from her life under any cir-
cumstances is extraordinary. Thus, to honor a child’s right to family
integrity, courts must consider that the defendant is a parent in all situations,
not just in cases that are particularly sympathetic. Previously, many courts
believed that the mandatory sentencing guidelines prevented judges from
taking familial relationships and responsibilities into account when making
sentencing determinations. But United States v. Booker,363 where the Su-
preme Court found mandatory sentencing guidelines unconstitutional,364 sug-
gests that there is room for taking children’s wishes into account.365
Given public defenders’ already colossal caseloads and the issues re-
lated to children’s counsel discussed above, one way to incorporate this ap-
proach is to use San Francisco’s Adult Probation Department (“APD”)
model, which conducts family impact assessments and shares its findings
with the court for sentencing.366 Importantly, this family impact statement is
prepared for every defendant, regardless of her alleged crime.367 The state-
ment “includes the number of the defendant’s minor children, whether the
defendant provides financial support to his or her children, whether the de-
fendant is the primary caregiver, and whether the defendant lives with his or
her children.”368 As a result of these “family-focused policies and proce-
dures,” the APD caseload dropped 43% in six years and the City of San
Francisco saw a 40% decrease in its jail population during the same
period.369
Alternatively, family impact assessments could be used the way that
victim impact statements are used in courtrooms across the country. Under
federal law, victims have the “right to be reasonably heard at any public
proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any
parole proceeding.”370 They are also allowed in criminal proceedings in all
fifty states subject to specific rules in each jurisdiction.371
361 Id. at 128 (citing United States v. Cacho, 951 F.2d 308, 311 (11th Cir. 1992)).
362 Id.
363 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
364 Id. at 245.
365 See Boudin, supra note 141, at 97. R
366 Emily W. Andersen, “Not Ordinarily Relevant”: Bringing Family Responsibilities to
the Federal Sentencing Table, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1501, 1526 (2015).
367 Id. at 1527.
368 Id.
369 Id. at 1527–28.
370 Madison H. Kemph, Reconsidering the Use of Victim Impact Evidence, 31 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 673, 673–74 (2018) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3771).
371 Id. at 673.
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Victim impact statements highlight “a crime’s medical, psychological,
social, and financial impact on a victim.”372 To counterbalance this informa-
tion, and to respect the child’s right to family integrity, family impact assess-
ments would allow the court to recognize the effects on the defendant’s
children and other family members in the course of performing traditional
sentencing analysis.373 This could incentivize carceral alternatives, probation,
or deferred sentencing.374 Indeed, courts can make this assessment far earlier
than sentencing.
Even if a family impact assessment is not available, to preserve a
child’s right to family integrity, courts should first consider whether incar-
ceration is necessary at all. They should determine whether “non-incarcera-
tive alternatives such as halfway houses, home detention, intensive probation
supervision, day prisons, [or] community service”375 would be appropriate.
Some factors that children could raise, if allowed to participate in the pro-
cess, include “the number of dependent children, their ages, and whether
those children have special needs such as physical, emotional, or mental
disabilities.”376 Additionally, children (ideally with attorneys) should press
courts to consider “the likelihood of the defendant losing custody perma-
nently rather than temporarily” and particularly whether termination of pa-
rental rights is likely, due to the detrimental effects on children.377 The court
should also consider the nature of the crime and the child’s relationship with
her parents in determining whether the state’s purported interest in incarcera-
tion could be outweighed by the potential harms to the child. And, at the
very least, the court should consider the best interests of the child.378 These
factors could allow for some uniformity when determining whether to take
parenthood into account during the criminal process.
Critics, including the late Dan Markel and his colleagues Jennifer Col-
lins and Ethan Leib, argue that such a system would be unfair, as people
who commit similar crimes could be treated differently due to their status as
a parent.379 They suggest that another option might be deferred sentencing,
but only in the case of “irreplaceable caregivers.”380 In these instances where
the defendant is the “sole and irreplaceable” caregiver, Markel et al. suggest
that, for example, a parent could be incarcerated after the child has reached
the age of majority and is able to care for herself.381 But this approach lacks
372 Andersen, supra note 366, at 1513. R
373 Id. at 1515.
374 Id.
375 Susan E. Ellingstad, The Sentencing Guidelines: Downward Departures Based on a
Defendant’s Extraordinary Family Ties and Responsibilities, 76 MINN. L. REV. 957, 984
(1992).
376 Id. at 983.
377 Id.
378 Lerer, supra note 213, at 46. R
379 Dan Markel et al., Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1147, 1214 (2007).
380 Id. at 1221.
381 Id. at 1221–22 (internal citations omitted).
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recognition of the fact that children do best when they maintain contact with
both parents and that all caregivers are irreplaceable to the child in ques-
tion.382 Deferred sentencing should be considered in all cases where the ac-
cused is a parent, not just those where the caregiver is “irreplaceable.” And,
once again, prosecutors and judges treat similar defendants differently all the
time for all manner of reasons.383 To do so in service of family integrity
would be a welcome progression.
As a last resort, if incarceration is deemed necessary, some states have
programs that allow children to be placed with their mothers while incarcer-
ated.384 Thus, in some cases, parents, particularly those of infants, could be
sentenced to a facility that is specially designed to allow for continued bond-
ing between the parent and child. While some argue that prison is no place
for a child, what is sometimes lost is that when parents are sentenced, their
children are often sentenced, too—to foster care. Many foster children face a
high risk of abuse and grave long-term outcomes.385 Also, given that these
programs are new, there is little data to determine which scenario is more
beneficial for a child: separation from one’s parent or remaining with one’s
parent in a correctional facility.386 Finally, if no such option is available, to
give families the best chance at preserving their familial relationships, courts
should be required to sentence the parent to the facility that is closest to the
accused’s home and family. This may seem intuitive, but it is far from
reality.387
If a parent is ultimately incarcerated but becomes eligible for parole, a
child’s right to family integrity should be respected at this stage as well.
Parole hearings are notoriously shrouded in secrecy.388 In some states, the
incarcerated person herself is not even allowed to participate.389 As a result,
“parole boards can make decisions on almost any basis: hearsay, rumor, and
382 See Abramowicz, supra note 205, at 231. R
383 See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN SENTENCING: AN UPDATE TO
THE 2012 BOOKER REPORT 2 (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/research-publications/2017/20171114_Demographics.pdf, archived at https://
perma.cc/AYH2-QHEN.
384 Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 29, at 269–70. R
385 See Trivedi, supra note 148, at 541–52. R
386 Abramowicz, supra note 205, at 234–35; Elizabeth Chuck, Prison nurseries give in- R
carcerated mothers a chance to raise their babies – behind bars, NBC NEWS (Aug. 4, 2018),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/prison-nurseries-give-incarcerated-mothers-chance-
raise-their-babies-behind-n894171, archived at https://perma.cc/VL5T-U7DE.
387 Anna Iskikian, The Sentencing Judge’s Role in Safeguarding the Parental Rights of
Incarcerated Individuals, 53 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 133, 158 (2019) (“One . . . obstacle
is the physical distance between incarcerated parents and their children; the vast majority of
state and federal prisons are located more than one hundred miles away from the inmate’s
home. Because fewer female prisons exist as compared to the number of all-male prisons,
mothers are even more likely to be imprisoned a substantial distance away from their fami-
lies.”) (internal citations omitted).
388 Beth Schwartzapfel, Parole Boards: Problems And Promise, 28 FED. SENT’G REP. 79,
79 (2015).
389 Id. (“Because Alabama inmates are not allowed to attend their own parole hearings,
Curry’s mother traveled to Montgomery to speak on his behalf.”).
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instinct are all fair game” with some states even allowing consideration of
“the inmate’s culture, language, values, mores, judgments, communicative
ability and other unique qualities.”390 And in most of the country, parole
boards are required to hear from the victim before deciding whether to grant
parole and many boards will not grant parole if opposed by the victim.391
When the incarcerated are separated from their families, it may lead to
permanent damage to their family relationships, which does not serve the
goals of the criminal legal system, including the goal of rehabilitation. If
released into a world with no family support, formerly incarcerated people
are more likely to return to prison and as such, “strong family ties have
always been a critical positive factor in parole decisions.”392 Ensuring that a
child’s perspective is raised in parole hearings acknowledges the child’s right
to her family. Not only allowing information about the devastating impacts
of incarceration on a child but making them a necessary consideration will
allow the state to comport with its duty to use narrowly tailored means to
achieve its goals. Allowing children to be heard at these hearings, or at the
very least, allowing family impact statements to be used  as they are being
used in sentencing, would allow these effects to be considered.
These proposals show respect for family integrity and particularly that
children have a right to their families. Integrating these concepts into crimi-
nal adjudications and sentencing shows that a balance between the compet-
ing interests of public safety and family preservation are possible.
IV. CONCLUSION
If family integrity means nothing else, it should mean that all family
members have constitutional rights to their relationships with each other.
While any asserted liberty interest will have to be balanced against compet-
ing state interests, it is vital that we recognize the liberty interests in the first
place. And, more importantly, lawyers and advocates should deploy these
interests in proceedings where real families are at stake. Practitioners in im-
migration, criminal, and family regulation proceedings staring down state-
sanctioned family destruction should argue a child’s independent, constitu-
tional right to family integrity. Doing so would amplify children’s voices,
and in so doing, empower them and acknowledge their self-determination.
This is particularly true for marginalized children whose voices are usually
ignored the most. If those in positions of power assert this right, perhaps
children will be more successful than their parents have been in preserving
their shared family bonds.
390 Id.
391 Id. at 81–82 (“More than 60 percent of the nation’s parole boards are required to hear
victim input before they make a decision, according to a 2008 survey, and 40 percent said that
victim input is ‘very influential’ to their decision-making process.”).
392 Justin Brooks & Kimberly Bahna, “It’s A Family Affair”—The Incarceration of the
American Family: Confronting Legal and Social Issues, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 271, 275 (1994).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLC\56-2\HLC201.txt unknown Seq: 48  5-OCT-21 16:41
